Reliable Broadcast in Wireless Networks with Probabilistic Failures

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Abstract

We consider the problem of reliable broadcast in a wireless network in which nodes are prone to failure. In the failure mode considered in this paper, each node can fail independently with probability p. Failures are permanent. The primary focus is on Byzantine failures, but we also handle crash-stop failures. We consider two network models: a regular grid, and a random network. For the grid network model, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the degree of each node as a function of the total number of nodes n in the network, and the failure probability p, so as to ensure that reliable broadcast succeeds with probability 1, as $n \to \infty$. Our necessary and sufficient conditions for reliable broadcast with Byzantine failures indicate that failure probability should be less than $\frac{1}{2}$, and the *critical* node degree is $\Theta\left(d_{min} + \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}\right)$ (where d_{min} is the minimum node degree associated with a non-empty neighborhood, and is a small constant). For a random network we prove that, for failure probability less than $\frac{1}{2}$, the *critical* average degree for reliable broadcast is $\Theta(\ln n + \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}})$ for p < 1, and our results improve upon previously existing results for this model, when p approaches 0. We also identify an interesting similarity in the structure of various known results in the literature pertaining to a set of related problems in the realm of connectivity and reliable broadcast.

Index Terms

Byzantine failure, crash-stop failure, broadcast

I. INTRODUCTION

Reliable broadcast in the presence of Byzantine and crash-stop failures has been extensively studied under different network and failure models. A reliable broadcast mechanism may be of significant utility in large-scale sensor network deployments. While the shared nature of the wireless medium is conducive to the broadcast operation, the unreliability of the wireless channel, and the possibility of collisions can make it a difficult problem to solve. As a first step towards addressing the issue, it is useful to focus on an idealized wireless channel. We consider the problem of reliable broadcast in a such an idealized wireless network. We primarily focus on Byzantine failures, but have also

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considered the case of crash-stop failures. The failures are permanent and are assumed to occur probabilistically, i.e., each node can fail independently with a certain probability p. However, once failure has happened, the faulty nodes can exhibit worst-case behavior. We present asymptotically tight bounds on the conditions under which reliable broadcast is achievable.

We show that when nodes exhibit Byzantine failures, reliable broadcast in a grid network of n nodes requires that p be less than half, and the *critical* node degree (defined in Section II) is $\Theta\left(d_{min} + \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}\right)$ for asymptotic achievability of reliable broadcast. This may alternatively be stated as $\Theta\left(d_{min} + \frac{\ln n}{D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P)}\right)$ where $Q_{\frac{1}{2}}$ denotes the Bernoulli $(\frac{1}{2})$ distribution, P denotes the Bernoulli(p) distribution, and D(Q||P) denotes the relative entropy (or Kullback-Leibler distance) between distributions Q and P. We also prove that in a randomly deployed network with Byzantine failures, the critical average node degree for reliable broadcast is $\Theta(\ln n + \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2n} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-n)}})$ (also expressible

as
$$\Theta\left(\frac{\ln n}{\frac{1}{2}-p+\frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}}\right)$$
 when $p < \frac{1}{2}$.

We also consider the case of crash-stop failures in a grid network. For crash-stop failures, the problem of reliable broadcast is equivalent to connectivity. For this case, we have results showing that the critical node degree is $\Theta\left(d_{min} + \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}}\right)$ with p < 1, or alternatively stated, $\Theta\left(d_{min} + \frac{\ln n}{D(Q_1||P)}\right)$, where Q_1 is the *Bernoulli*(1) distribution. Our results improve upon previous results proved in [1] when the failure probability p approaches 0.

We also identify an interesting but intuitive similarity in the structure of results (previously known results, as well as the results derived in this paper) for a set of related problems pertaining to connectivity and reliable broadcast. This is discussed in Section XX.

II. NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY

We use the following asymptotic notation:

- $O(g(n)) = \{f(n) | \exists c, N_o, \text{ such that } \forall n > N_o, f(n) \le cg(n)\}$
- $o(g(n)) = \{f(n) | \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{f(n)}{g(n)} = 0\}$ $\omega(g(n)) = \{f(n) | g(n) = o(f(n))\}$
- $\Omega(g(n)) = \{f(n)|g(n) = O(f(n))\}$
- $\Theta(g(n)) = \{f(n) | \exists c_1, c_2, N_o, \text{ such that } c_1g(n) \le f(n) \le c_2g(n) \text{ for } n > N_o\}$

We use d to denote node degree, r to denote transmission range, and D to denote network diameter. The neighbor-set of a node u, including itself, is denoted by nbd(u). The set of neighbors minus itself is termed as $nbd'(u) = nbd(u) - \{u\}.$

By critical transmission range for reliable broadcast, we imply a r_{critical}, such that

- For some constant $c_1 > 0$, reliable broadcast fails with some positive probability if $r < r_{critical}$
- For some constant $c_2 > 0$, reliable broadcast is achieved with probability 1 if $r \ge r_{critical}$

Thus:

- $r_{critical}$ is $\Omega(f(n,p)) \Longrightarrow \exists c_1 > 0$, such that $r \leq c_1 f(n,p) \Longrightarrow \lim Pr[\text{reliable broadcast achievable}] < 1$
- $r_{critical}$ is $O(f(n,p)) \implies \exists c_2 > 0$, such that $r \ge c_2 f(n,p) \implies \lim_{n \to \infty} Pr[\text{reliable broadcast achievable}] = 1$
- $r_{critical} = \Theta(f(n,p))$ implies that $r_{critical}$ is $\Omega(f(n,p))$ and O(f(n,p)).

In a grid network, and under the considered distance metric (discussed in Section III), the node degree is exactly determined by specifying the transmission range. Hence, we can define the notion of *critical* degree $d_{critical}$ correponding to the transmission range r_{critical}. Thus:

• $d_{critical} = \Omega(g(n, p)) \exists c_1 > 0$, such that: $d \le c_1 g(n, p) \implies \lim_{n \to \infty} Pr[\text{reliable broadcast achievable}] < 1$ This yields a necessary condition. If $\lim Pr[reliable broadcast achievable] = 0$, it is a strong necessary condition.

- $d_{critical} = O(f(n, p)) \implies \exists c_2 > 0$, such that: $d \ge c_2 f(n, p) \implies \lim_{n \to \infty} Pr[\text{reliable broadcast achievable}] = 1$ This yields a *sufficient* condition.
- $d_{critical}$ is $\Theta(f(n,p))$ implies that $d_{critical}$ is $\Omega(f(n,p))$ and O(f(n,p))

In a random network, the degrees of individual nodes can vary; however, it is possible to define a notion of *critical* average degree $d_{critical}^{avg}$, which is the average degree corresponding to the range $r_{critical}$. Then $d_{critical}^{avg}$ can be expressed in asymptotic notation, similar to $d_{critical}$ for a grid network.

III. PROBLEM MODEL

We consider a two network models, viz. a regular grid, where nodes are located on a two-dimensional square grid (each grid unit is a 1×1 square), and a random network, where node locations are i.i.d. over the deployment region. In both models, the network is assumed to be deployed over a $\sqrt{n} \ge \sqrt{n}$ square region. The pre-failure topology (i.e., node locations) of the deployed network is assumed to be known by all nodes.

Formal Definition of Reliable Broadcast: Any node in the entire network can originate a broadcast message. In the Byzantine failure model, this source node may be faulty. Thus goal is to ensure that if the source is non-faulty, every non-faulty node in the network should correctly receive and determine the broadcast value; if the source is faulty, all non-faulty node should agree on some common value. In the crash-stop failure model, a message can only be originated by a non-faulty node (as faulty nodes cease to function), and the goal is to ensure that all non-faulty nodes receive this value.

If even one non-faulty node (in either model) fails to make a valid value determination, the broadcast is deemed to have failed. Reliable broadcast is said to fail in a given fault configuration, if it fails for at least one possible broadcast origin/source.

For a given broadcast instance, once an origin/source is designated, it is identified as (0,0). All nodes can then be uniquely identified by their coordinate location (x,y) w.r.t. this origin. In the grid network model, the node coordinates are always *integers*, while for random networks they are *real* numbers. All nodes have a common transmission radius r(n,p). For grid networks, we assume that r(n,p) is an integer, and for random networks it is allowed to be any real number. A message transmitted by a node (x,y) is heard by all nodes within distance r(n,p)from it (where distance is defined in terms of the particular metric under consideration). The set of these nodes is termed the neighborhood of (x,y).

In this paper, we consider two distance metrics: L_{∞} and L_2 . The L_{∞} metric is the metric induced by the L_{∞} norm [2], such that the distance between points (x_1, y_1) and (x_2, y_2) is given by max{ $|x_1 - x_2|, |y_1 - y_2|$ } in the this metric. Thus nbd(a,b) comprises a square of side 2r with its centroid at (a,b), and the degree of a node is $4r^2 + 4r$. In this metric, the minimum node degree $d_{min} = 8$ corresponding to r = 1. The L_2 metric is induced by the L_2 norm [2], and is the Euclidean distance metric. The L_2 distance between points (x_1, y_1) and (x_2, y_2) is given by $\sqrt{(x_1 - x_2)^2 + (y_1 - y_2)^2}$, and nbd(a,b) comprises nodes within a circle of radius r centered at (a,b). The L_{∞} metric enables more tractable analysis, from which necessary and sufficient conditions for the L_2 (Euclidean) metric proceed. In Section XI, we further elaborate on this.

A random failure mode is assumed, wherein each node can fail with probability p independently of other nodes. Failures are permanent. We primarily focus on Byzantine failures. In the Byzantine failure mode, a faulty node can behave arbitrarily, in contrast to crash-stop failures, where a faulty node simply stops functioning. However, in our model, the Byzantine nodes cannot spoof addresses or cause collisions, i.e., the MAC layer is assumed fault-free, and the Byzantine faults reside only in higher layers of the protocol stack. ¹. We assume that the channel is perfectly

 $^{^{1}}$ A methodology to handle a bounded number of collisions and address-spoofing was proposed in [3] for a locally bounded fault model. It might be possible to adapt it to handle the random failure model. This requires further investigation.

reliable, and a local broadcast is correctly received by all neighbors. The same *reliable local broadcast* assumption underlies the results in [4] and [5] for a locally bounded adversarial fault model. Note that while the *occurrence* of the permanent failures is probabilistic, the failed Byzantine nodes can thereafter choose to behave in a worst-case manner (i.e. modulate the messages they send to cause most confusion to non-faulty nodes). The non-faulty nodes do not know which nodes have failed.

IV. SOME USEFUL MATHEMATICAL RESULTS

We state some mathematical results that have been used in our proofs:

FACT 1: $\forall x \in [0,1] : \ln \frac{1}{1-x} \ge x$

FACT 2: If
$$|f(n)| \le n^{\frac{1}{2}-\varepsilon} (0 < \varepsilon < \frac{1}{2})$$
:

$$\left(1 + \frac{f(n)}{n}\right)^n \le e^{2f} \text{ for } n \ge 4$$
and
$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \left(1 + \frac{f(n)}{n}\right)^n = e^{(\lim_{n \to \infty} f(n))}$$

Proof: Let f(n) be such that $|f(n)| \le n^{\frac{1}{2}-\varepsilon}$, where $0 < \varepsilon < \frac{1}{2}$. Let $g(n) = (1 + \frac{f(n)}{n})^n$. Then:

$$\ln g = n \ln \left(1 + \frac{f(n)}{n}\right) = n \left(\frac{f(n)}{n} - \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{f(n)}{n}\right)^2 + \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{f(n)}{n}\right)^3 - \dots\right) [6]$$

$$= n \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (-1)^{k-1} \frac{1}{k} \left(\frac{f(n)}{n}\right)^k = f + \sum_{k=2}^{\infty} (-1)^{k-1} \frac{1}{k} \left(\frac{f(n)^k}{n^{k-1}}\right)$$

$$\leq f(n) + f(n) \sum_{k=2}^{\infty} \frac{1}{k} \left(\frac{f(n)}{n}\right)^{k-1} < f(n) + f(n) \sum_{k=2}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right)^{k-1}$$

$$= f(n) \left(1 + \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right)^k\right) = f(n) \left(1 + \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}}\right)$$

$$\leq 2f \text{ for } n \geq 4$$

$$\therefore \left(1 + \frac{f(n)}{n}\right)^n \leq e^{2f(n)} \text{ for } n \geq 4$$

$$\begin{split} \ln g &= n \ln \left(1 + \frac{f(n)}{n} \right) = n \left(\frac{f(n)}{n} - \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{f(n)}{n} \right)^2 + \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{f(n)}{n} \right)^3 - \dots \right) [6] = n \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} (-1)^{k-1} \frac{1}{k} \left(\frac{f(n)}{n} \right)^k \\ &= f(n) + \sum_{k=2}^{\infty} (-1)^{k-1} \frac{1}{k} \left(\frac{f(n)^k}{n^{k-1}} \right) \\ &\lim_{n \to \infty} \ln g = \lim_{n \to \infty} \left[f(n) + \sum_{k=2}^{\infty} (-1)^{k-1} \frac{1}{k} \left(\frac{f(n)^k}{n^{k-1}} \right) \right] = \lim_{n \to \infty} f(n) \\ &\therefore \lim_{n \to \infty} g(n) = e^{(\lim_{n \to \infty} f(n))} \end{split}$$

FACT 3: For all $0 \le x < 1$:

$$\ln\left(1+x\right) \le \frac{x}{1-x}$$

Proof: When x = 0, this is trivially true. For 0 < x < 1: $\ln(1+x) = x - \frac{x^2}{2} + \frac{x^3}{3} - \dots = x(1 - \frac{x}{2} + \frac{x^2}{3} - \dots) \le x(1 + x + x^2 + \dots) = \frac{x}{1-x}$, since 0 < x < 1.

FACT 4: If c > 0 is a positive constant independent of n, and $b \ge 1$ is another positive constant independent of n, then $\exists n_o \in \mathbb{N}$ such that: $1 - \frac{1}{(\ln n)^b} \le \frac{1}{n^{\frac{c}{n}}}$ for $n > n_o$

Proof:

$$\begin{array}{l} \because \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{(\ln n)^b}} \geq e^{\frac{1}{(\ln n)^b}} \ (\text{from Fact 1}) \\ \therefore 1 - \frac{1}{(\ln n)^b} \leq e^{-\frac{1}{(\ln n)^b}} = \frac{1}{e^{\frac{1}{(\ln n)^b}}} = \frac{1}{e^{\frac{\ln n}{(\ln n)^{(b+1)}}}} \\ = \frac{1}{n^{\frac{1}{(\ln n)^{(b+1)}}}} \leq \frac{1}{n^{\frac{c}{n}}} \ \text{for large } n \\ \therefore \exists n_o \in \mathbb{N} \ \text{s.t.} \ \frac{1}{(\ln n)^{(b+1)}} \geq \frac{c}{n}, \forall n > n_o \end{array}$$

LEMMA 1: (Jogdeo & Samuels [7]) Given $X = Y_1 + Y_2 + ..., +Y_n$ where $\forall i, Y_i = Bernoulli(p_i)$, and $\sum p_i = np$, the median *m* of the distribution is either $\lfloor np \rfloor or \lceil np \rceil$, i.e., $Pr[X \le m] \ge \frac{1}{2}$ and $Pr[X \ge m] \ge \frac{1}{2}$.

Corollary 1: Given $X = Y_1 + Y_2 + ..., + Y_n$ where $\forall i, Y_i = Bernoulli(p)$, the median *m* of the distribution is either $\lfloor np \rfloor or \lceil np \rceil$, i.e., $Pr[X \le m] \ge \frac{1}{2}$ and $Pr[X \ge m] \ge \frac{1}{2}$.

Proof: The proof proceeds by setting $p_1 = p_2 = ... = p_n = p$ and applying Lemma 1.

Corollary 2: Given $X = Y_1 + Y_2 + ..., +Y_n$ where *n* is even, and $\forall i, Y_i = Bernoulli(p)$ where $p \ge \frac{1}{2}$, the median *m* of the distribution satisfies $m \ge \frac{n}{2}$.

Proof: We know that *m* is either $\lfloor np \rfloor or \lceil np \rceil$. When $p = \frac{1}{2}$, $m = \frac{n}{2}$ (as *n* is even). For $p > \frac{1}{2}$, $m \ge \lfloor np \rfloor \ge \lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor = \frac{n}{2}$.

LEMMA 2: (Chernoff Bound) If $X = \sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i$, where each X_i is independent and *Bernoulli* (p_i) , then for $0 < \beta < 1$:

$$Pr[X \le (1-\beta)E[X]] \le \exp(-\frac{\beta^2}{2}E[X])$$
⁽¹⁾

LEMMA 3: (Relative Entropy Form of Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound[8]) If $X = \sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i$, where each X_i is *Bernoulli*(p), then for $p \le \beta \le 1$:

$$Pr[X \ge \beta n] \le e^{-n(\beta \ln \frac{\beta}{p} + (1-\beta)\ln \frac{1-\beta}{1-p})}$$
(2)

LEMMA 4: (Chernoff Bound [9]) Let $X_1, ..., X_n$ be independent Poisson trials, where $Pr[X_i = 1] = p_i$. Let $X = \sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i$. Then, for any $\beta > 0$:

$$Pr[X \ge (1+\beta)E[X]] < \left(\frac{e^{\beta}}{(1+\beta)^{(1+\beta)}}\right)^{E[X]}$$
(3)

LEMMA 5: (Chernoff Upper Tail Bound [9]) Let $X_1, ..., X_n$ be independent Poisson trials, where $Pr[X_i = 1] = p_i$. Let $X = \sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i$. Then, for $0 < \beta \le 1$:

$$Pr[X \ge (1+\beta)E[X]] \le \exp(-\frac{\beta^2}{3}E[X])$$
(4)

LEMMA 6: [10] If $X_1, X_2, ..., X_n$ are drawn i.i.d. from alphabet χ according to Q(x), then probability of sequence **x** is given by:

$$O^{(n)}(\mathbf{x}) = e^{-n(H(P_x) + D(P_x || Q))}$$
(5)

where H and P denote the entropy and relative entropy functions (here considered w.r.t base e).

Also, for any distributions P and Q, the size of type class T(P) satisfies:

$$\frac{1}{(n+1)^{|\chi|}} e^{nH(P)} \le |T(p)| \le e^{nH(P)}$$
(6)

and, the probability of the type class T(P) under Q is governed by:

$$\frac{1}{(n+1)^{|\chi|}}e^{-n(D(P||Q))} \le Q^{(n)}(T(p)) \le e^{-n(D(P||Q))}$$
(7)

FACT 5: For all 0 < x < 1:

FACT 6: For all 0 < x

$$\ln\frac{1}{1-x} + \ln\frac{1}{1+x} \ge x^2$$

Proof:

$$\ln\frac{1}{1-x} + \ln\frac{1}{1+x} = -(\ln(1-x) + \ln(1+x)) = -\left(\left(x - \frac{x^2}{2} + \frac{x^3}{3} - \dots\right) + \left((-x) - \frac{(-x)^2}{2} + \frac{(-x)^3}{3} - \dots\right)\right) = 2\left(\frac{x^2}{2} + \frac{x^4}{4} + \frac{x^6}{6} + \dots\right) \ge x^2$$
(8)

< 1:		
	$\ln \frac{1}{2} + \ln \frac{1}{2} > 4(\frac{1}{2} - p)^2$	
	2p + 2(1-p) = (2 - p)	

Proof: Set x = 1 - 2p. Then: $\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)} = \ln \frac{1}{1-x} + \ln \frac{1}{1+x} \ge (1-2p)^2 = 4(\frac{1}{2}-p)^2$ by application of Fact 5.

LEMMA 7: (Vapnik-Chervonenkis Theorem) Let S be a set with finite VC dimension VCdim(S). Let $\{X_i\}$ be i.i.d. random variables with distribution *P*. Then for $\varepsilon, \delta > 0$:

$$Pr\left(\sup_{D\in\mathcal{S}}\left|\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}I_{X_{i}\in D}-P(D)\right|\leq\varepsilon\right)>1-\delta$$

whenever $N>\max\left(\frac{8VCdim(\mathcal{S})}{\varepsilon}\log_{2}\frac{16e}{\varepsilon},\frac{4}{\varepsilon}\log_{2}\frac{2}{\delta}\right)$

LEMMA 8: Suppose we are given a region of area *n*, with *n* nodes located uniformly at random. Consider all axis-parallel rectangles of area a(n). If $a(n) \ge 100\alpha \log n, 1 \le \alpha \le \frac{n}{100 \log n}$, then each such rectangle has at least $100\alpha \ln n - 50 \log n$ nodes, with high probability.

Proof: We know that the set of axis-parallel rectangles has VC-dimension 4. In our construction, we have the set of all axis-parallel rectangles S of area $100\alpha \ln n$. Then considering the *n* random variables X_i denoting node positions, $Pr[X_i \in D(D \in S] = \frac{100\alpha \ln n}{n}$. Then, from the VC-theorem (Lemma 7):

$$Pr\left(\sup_{D \in \mathcal{S}} \left| \frac{\text{No. of nodes in}D}{n} - \frac{100\alpha \ln n}{n} \right| \le \varepsilon(n) \right)$$

> $1 - \delta(n)$
whenever $n > \max\left(\frac{32}{\varepsilon} \log_2 \frac{16e}{\varepsilon}, \frac{4}{\varepsilon} \log_2 \frac{2}{\delta}\right)$

This is satisfied when $\varepsilon(n) = \delta(n) = \frac{50 \ln n}{n}$. Thus, with probability at least $1 - \frac{50 \ln n}{n}$, the population Pop(D) of cell *D* satisfies:

$$100\alpha \ln n - 50\ln n \le Pop(D) \le 100\alpha \ln n + 50\ln n \tag{9}$$

This completes the proof.

FACT 7: If we attempt to divide the $\sqrt{n} \ge \sqrt{n}$ grid into disjoint neighborhoods (as in Fig. 1), then the number of such disjoint neighborhoods that can be obtained is at least $\frac{|\sqrt{n}|}{(2r+1)^2} \ge \frac{(\sqrt{n}-1)^2}{4r^2+4r+1} \ge \frac{n}{8r^2}$ for large *n*. Observing that $d = 4r^2 + 4r$, the number of such disjoint neighborhoods obtainable is at least $\frac{|\sqrt{n}|}{(2r+1)^2} \ge \frac{(\sqrt{n}-1)^2}{4r^2+4r+1} \ge \frac{n}{2d}$ for large *n*

Byzantine Failures

V. RELATED WORK

Reliable broadcast in radio networks has been studied prior work such as [11], [4], [5] and [12]. Crash-stop failures are considered in [11] for finite networks comprising nodes located in a regular grid pattern and algorithms are described for efficient broadcast to the part of the network that is reachable from the source. However this work does not attempt to quantify the number of faults that render some nodes unreachable. In [4], a locally bounded model is considered, where an adversary is free to place faults, as long as no neighborhood has more thasn t faults. It was shown that for a network of nodes located on an infinite grid of unit squares and having transmission radius r, reliable broadcast is not achievable for $t \ge \lceil \frac{1}{2}r(2r+1) \rceil$ (in both L_{∞} and L_2 metrics). This was established as an *exact threshold* in L_{∞} by [5], and a protocol was described that achieved the threshold. An approximate threshold was also established for the L_2 metric (that is tight asymptotically, and corresponds to the same fraction of a neighborhood as in L_{∞}). In [13], a tight bound for tolerable t using the broadcast protocol of [4] was established. In [14], further study of the locally bounded fault model has been undertaken on arbitrary graphs. Upper and lower bounds for achievability of reliable broadcast are presented based on graph-theoretic parameters, for arbitrary graphs. However, no exact thresholds are established. It is also shown that there exist certain graphs in which algorithms that work with knowledge of topology succeed in achieving reliable broadcast, while those that lack this knowledge fail to do so.

Scenarios involving a collision-causing adversary are addressed in [3], [15], [16].

In closely related work, [12] considers the case of message-passing and radio networks with random transient failures. In our knowledge, the results in this paper are the first for radio networks exhibiting random but permanent Byzantine failures.

VI. NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY

We briefly describe here notation and terminology that shall be used in this paper. Nodes can be identified by their grid location i.e. (x, y) denotes the node at (x, y). The neighborhood of (x, y) comprises all nodes within distance r of (x, y) and is denoted as nbd(x, y). The degree of each node is referred to as d. In L_{∞} metric, $d = 4r^2 + 4r$, while

the size of a neighborhood (including the neighborhood center) is $d+1 = 4r^2 + 4r + 1$. Thus, the minimum degree is $d_{min} = 8$, corresponding to r = 1. The diameter of the network (in terms of distance, and not number of hops) is referred to as D. If n is a perfect square, $D = \sqrt{n}$. The source of the broadcast may be deemed to be situated at (0,0), without affecting generality of the results. In general, we allow any node of the network to be the source (with a corresponding shift of reference coordinates). For succint description, we define a term pnbd(x,y) where $pnbd(x,y) = nbd(x-1,y) \cup nbd(x+1,y) \cup nbd(x,y-1) \cup nbd(x,y+1)$. Intuitively pnbd(x,y) denotes the *perturbed neighborhood* of (x,y), obtained by perturbing the center of the neighborhood to one of the nodes immediately adjacent to (x,y) on the grid. Besides, we use *Bernoulli*(p) to denote a Bernoulli random variable with parameter p.

VII. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR RELIABLE BROADCAST

THEOREM 1: If a non-faulty node $u \notin nbd(s)$ has at least half faulty neighbors, and all message values are equally likely, it can be made to commit to an erroneous value with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$.

Proof: Assume that the message is drawn from $\{0, 1\}$. A non-faulty node *u* which is not an immediate neighbor of the source must rely on messages received from its neighbors. Recall that $nbd'(u) = nbd(u) - \{u\}$.

First consider any deterministic function that takes as argument messages received from all neighbors and outputs one of 0 or 1. Then corresponding to each fault configuration C_1 with $t \ge \frac{d}{2}$ or more faults in nbd'(u) (this also implies t faults in nbd(u) as u is non-faulty), there is another configuration C_2 with t faults in nbd'(u), such that all non-faulty nodes in C_1 are faulty in C_2 , while the non-faulty nodes in C_2 were all faulty in C_1 . Then, the faulty nodes can modulate their message-sending behavior so that u is unable to distinguish between the case where the correct broadcast value was 0 and configuration was C_1 and the case when the correct value was 1 and the configuration was C_2 (recall that once failure has happened, the faulty nodes can exhibit worst-case behavior).

Stated formally: suppose $S_1 \subseteq nbd'(u)$ is the set of faulty neighbors in C_1 , and $S_1^c = nbd'(u) - S_1$ is its complement, i.e., the set of non-faulty neighbors. Then we know that $|S_1| \ge \lceil \frac{|nbd'(u)|}{2} \rceil \ge |S_1^c|$. Consider a fault configuration C_2 in which the set of faulty neighbors is $S_2 = S_1^c \cup \mathcal{V}$ where $\mathcal{V} \subseteq S_1$ is some subset of S_1 that satisfies $|\mathcal{V}| = |S_1| - |S_1^c|$. It is easy to see that $|S_1| = |S_2|$. Consider the case where the correct value is 0, and configuration is C_1 . Then all nodes in S_1 can behave as though the value were 1, while the nodes in S_1^c will always act according to value 0. Now suppose the correct value is 1, and configuration is C_2 . Then the faulty nodes in $S_1^c \subseteq S_2$ behave as though the value were 0, while nodes in $\mathcal{V} = S_2 - S_1^c$ act as per the correct value 1. The non-faulty nodes in S_2^c always act as per value 1. From the viewpoint of node u, the two situations are indistinguishable.

Now let us consider the possibility of using a probabilistic decision rule. Given a certain set of messages received from neighbors, we need to consider the conditional probability that the value is 0 or 1. Then, from the above discussion it is clear that for a given set of received messages from neighbors, there exists a pair of fault configurations, and associated faulty-node behavior, with the same number of faulty neighbors, where the correct message values are different. Since failures are i.i.d. with probability p, and each value 0 or 1 is equiprobable, u cannot expect to choose the correct one with a probability greater than half.

It is not hard to see that if the message can have more than two possible (equiprobable) values, it cannot increase the probability of correct choice.

THEOREM 2: When failure probability p satisfies $\frac{1}{2} \leq 1 - \frac{96}{n}$, and $\frac{n}{d} \to \infty$ (i.e., d = o(n)):

 $\lim \text{Pr}[\text{ reliable broadcast fails}] > \eta > 0($ for some positive constant $\eta \leq 1$)

In particular, if $\frac{n(1-p)}{d} \rightarrow \infty$, then:

 $\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[\text{ reliable broadcast fails}] = 1$



Fig. 1. Division of network into disjoint neighborhoods

When $1 - p = o(\frac{1}{n})$, all nodes are faulty w.h.p., and the broadcast issue is irrelevant.

Proof: Suppose we consider a particular node j in the network. Then, if j is non-faulty, but more than half of its neighbors are faulty, reliable broadcast fails with probability at least half. Given that there are d neighbors, and each may fail independently with probability p, let Y_j denote the number of failed neighbors of j. Then, Y_j takes values from 0, 1, ..., d, and $E[Y_j] \ge \frac{d}{2}$. Thus $\lfloor E[Y] \rfloor \ge \lfloor \frac{d}{2} \rfloor = \frac{d}{2}$ (since $d = 4r^2 + 4r$ is always even). Thus, $Pr[Y \ge \frac{d}{2}] \ge Pr[Y \ge \lfloor E[Y] \rfloor] \ge \frac{1}{2}$ (from Lemma 1). Let us call this probability q.

$$Pr[j \text{ alive; at least half } nbd(j) \text{ faulty }] \ge (1-p)q \ge \frac{1-p}{2}$$

 $\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{n(1-p)}{d} = \gamma \ge 4$: Let us mark out a subset of nodes *j* such that the neighborhoods of these nodes are all disjoint, as in Fig. 1. Then from Fact 7, the number of such nodes that we may obtain is at least $\frac{n}{2d}$ for large *n*.

Let I_j be an indicator variable that takes value 1 if j is non-faulty but has at least half faulty neighbors, and commits to the wrong value. Then $Pr[I_j = 1] \ge \frac{1-p}{2}$, and all I_j 's are independent.

Let X be a random variable indicating the number of non-faulty nodes with at least half faulty neighbors that resultantly commit to the wrong value. Then $E[X] = \sum_j Pr[I_j = 1] \ge \frac{1-p}{2}(\frac{n}{2d}) = \frac{n(1-p)}{4d}$.

Thus setting $\beta = \frac{1}{2}$ in the Chernoff Bound in Lemma 2:

$$\Pr[X \leq \frac{E[X]}{2}] \leq e^{-\frac{\beta^2 E[X]}{2}} = e^{-\frac{E[X]}{8}}$$

When $\frac{n(1-p)}{d} \to \infty, E[X] = \frac{n(1-p)}{4d} \to \infty$:

$$\underset{n \to \infty}{\lim} \Pr[X > \frac{E[X]}{2}] > \underset{n \to \infty}{\lim} (1 - e^{-\frac{E[X]}{8}}) = 1$$

Thus, as $n \to \infty$, the number of non-faulty nodes isolated by half or more faulty neighbors, and which commit to the wrong value, will also tend to infinity with probability 1.

When $\frac{n(1-p)}{d} \rightarrow \gamma \ge 4$:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[X \ge 2] \ge \Pr[X \ge \frac{E[X]}{2}] > \lim_{n \to \infty} (1 - e^{-\frac{E[X]}{8}}) = 1 - e^{-\frac{1}{4}} > 0$$

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Fig. 2. Division of network area into three segments

 $\lim_{n\to\infty} \frac{n(1-p)}{d} < 4, \text{ but } 1-p \ge \frac{96}{n}$ This implies that $1-p < \frac{4d}{n} \implies p \ge \frac{3}{4} > \frac{1}{2}$ for large n (since $\frac{n}{d} \to \infty$). Then the probability q of having half or more faulty neighbors is at least $\frac{1}{2}$ (from Lemma 1). Consider a partition of the network region into 3 segments A, B, and C as in Fig. 2. Each segment has at least $\lfloor \sqrt{n} \rfloor \frac{\lfloor \sqrt{n} \rfloor}{3} \ge \frac{n}{6}$ nodes for large n. Let p_A be the probability that segment A has at least one node u_A that is non-faulty. Let p_C and u_C be the corresponding probability and node for segment C. If such u_A and u_C exist, then it is evident that they are not mutual neighbors (since $\frac{n}{d} \to \infty$). Thus, if one of them (say u_C) has half or more faulty neighbors, then a broadcast from u_A cannot be received by u_C , with probability more than $\frac{1}{2}$ (from Theorem 1).

Let X_A be the total number of nodes in segment A that satisfy the desired property. Then $X_A = \sum_{j \in A} I'_j$, where I'_j are i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) random variables denoting whether j is faulty. Likewise, let X_C be the corresponding random variable for segment C. Then, it can be easily verified that $E[X_A] \ge \frac{n(1-p)}{6}$. Similarly $E[X_C] \ge \frac{n(1-p)}{6}$. Then by setting $\beta = \frac{1}{2}$ in Lemma 2, it can be seen that:

$$Pr[X_A < 1] \le Pr[X_A \le \frac{n(1-p)}{12}] \le Pr[X_A \le \frac{E[X_A]}{2}] \le e^{-\frac{E[X_A]}{8}} \le e^{-\frac{n(1-p)}{48}}$$
(10)

If there exist such nodes, let us select from them an u_A .

$$Pr[X_C < 1] \le Pr[X_C < \frac{n(1-p)}{12}] \le Pr[X_C \le \frac{E[X_C]}{2}] \le e^{-\frac{E[X_C]}{8}} \le e^{-\frac{n(1-p)}{48}}$$
(11)

If there exist such nodes, let us select from them an u_C .

Then by applying a union bound over the events that either one of u_A, u_C does not exist, or u_C does not have half or more faulty neighbors, it proceeds that:

$$Pr[\exists u_A, \exists u_C \text{ and } u_C \text{ has half or more faulty neighbors}] = p_b \ge 1 - e^{-\frac{n(1-p)}{48}} - e^{-\frac{n(1-p)}{48}} - q$$
(12)

Since $n(1-p) \ge 96$, we obtain:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} p_b \ge 1 - \frac{1}{e^2} - \frac{1}{e^2} - \frac{1}{2} > 0 \tag{13}$$

Thus u_C will make an erroneous decision about any messages broadcast by u_A with probability at least half, and reliable broadcast will fail with a positive probability at least $\frac{p_b}{2} > 0$.

$$1-p=o(\frac{1}{n})$$
:

 $Pr[All nodes faulty; broadcast issue moot] = p^n$ (14)

$$\geq (1 - (1 - p)))^n = (1 - g(n))^n \text{ where } \frac{g(n)}{1/n} = ng(n) \to 0$$
(15)

 $\lim Pr[\text{All nodes faulty; broadcast issue moot}]$ (16)

$$\geq \lim_{n \to \infty} (1 - g(n)))^n = \lim_{n \to \infty} \left(1 - \frac{ng(n)}{n} \right)^n \tag{17}$$

$$=e^{-\lim(ng(n))}=1$$
 from Fact 2 (18)

THEOREM 3: When $p \le \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{\ln n}$, and node degree $d \le \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}$, reliable broadcast asymptotically fails with probability 1.

Proof: Any failure probability $p \le \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{\ln n}$ can be expressed as $p = \frac{1}{2} - y$ for suitable $\frac{1}{\ln n} \le y \le \frac{1}{2}$. From Fact 6, $\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)} = 4(\frac{1}{2} - p)^2 \ge \frac{4}{(\ln n)^2}$.

Resultantly:

$$d \le \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}} \le \frac{\ln n}{\frac{4}{(\ln n)^2}} = \frac{(\ln n)^3}{4} < (\ln n)^3$$
(19)

Furthermore, one may see that:

$$\frac{\ln n}{2} + 6\ln\ln n \le \ln n - 4\ln\ln n \text{ for large enough } n \tag{20}$$

Consider a particular node j in the network. Then, if j is non-faulty, but more than half of its neighbors are faulty, reliable broadcast fails with probability at least half (from Theorem 1). Given that there are d neighbors, and each may fail independently with probability p, let $I_{jk}(1 \le k \le d)$ denote the indicator variable corresponding to neighbor k of j (enumerated in some order), such that $I_{jk} = 1$ if k is faulty, and 0 otherwise. Then $Y_j = \sum I_{jk}$ denotes the number of failed neighbors of j. Y takes values from 0, 1, ..., d, and E[Y] = pd. $Pr[Y_j \ge \frac{d}{2}] = \sum_{i=\frac{d}{2}}^{d} {d \choose i} p^i (1-p)^{(d-i)}$. Let us simply consider the event $Y_j = \frac{d}{2}$. Then we can apply the lower bound from Lemma 6. The variables $I_{jk}(1 \le k \le d)$ are drawn from $\chi = \{0,1\}$ as per distribution P = Bernoulli(p), and the distribution corresponding to $Y_j = \frac{d}{2}$ is $Bernoulli(\frac{1}{2})$ (we shall refer to this as $Q_{\frac{1}{2}}$). $|\chi| = 2$, and $\frac{1}{(d+1)^{|\chi|}} = \frac{1}{(d+1)^2} > \frac{1}{\frac{3}{2}d^2} = \frac{2}{3}e^{-2\ln d}$ (recall that in L_{infty} metric, d is always even, and $d \ge 8$). Thus, we obtain:

$$Pr[Y_{j} \ge \frac{d}{2}] \ge Pr[Y_{j} = \frac{d}{2}] \ge \frac{1}{(d+1)^{|\chi|}} e^{-d(D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P))}$$

$$= \frac{1}{(d+1)^{2}} e^{-d(D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P))} > \frac{2}{3} e^{-d(D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P)) - 2\ln d}$$

$$> \frac{2}{3} e^{-(\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}})(\frac{1}{2}\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \frac{1}{2}\ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}) - 6\ln \ln n} \text{ from Eqn. (19)}$$

$$= \frac{2}{3} e^{-\frac{1}{2}\ln n - 6\ln \ln n} \ge \frac{2(\ln n)^{4}}{3n} \text{ from Eqn. (20)}$$

Let us denote the L.H.S. of the above equation by q.

$$Pr[j \text{ non-faulty; at least half } nbd(j) \text{ faulty }] \ge (1-p)q$$
(22)

$$> \frac{1}{2} \frac{2(\ln n)^4}{3n} = \frac{(\ln n)^4}{3n}$$
 (23)

Let us mark out a subset of nodes j such that the neighborhoods of these nodes are all disjoint, as in Fig. 1. Then, as noted earlier, the number of such nodes that we may obtain is $k \ge \frac{n}{2d}$ for large n. Let I_j be an indicator variable that takes value 1 if j is non-faulty and has at least half faulty neighbors. Then $Pr[I_j = 1] = \frac{(\ln n)^4}{3n}$, and all I_j 's are independent. Let I'_j be an indicator variable that takes value 1 if j is non-faulty but commits to a wrong



Fig. 3. Depiction of $qnbd_A$, $qnbd_B$, $qnbd_C$, $qnbd_D$

Fig. 4. Depiction of $qnbd_{A'}$, $qnbd_{B'}$, $qnbd_{C'}$, $qnbd_{D'}$

value. From Theorem 1, we know that if a non-faulty node has half or more faulty neighbors, it will commit to

the wrong value with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$. Thus $Pr[I'_j = 1] \ge \frac{1}{2}Pr[I_j = 1] \ge \frac{(\ln n)^4}{6n}$. Let X be a random variable indicating the number of non-faulty nodes with half or more faulty neighbors that commit to the wrong value. Then $X = \sum I'_j$, and $E[X] = \sum Pr[I'_j = 1] \ge \frac{(\ln n)^4}{6n} \left(\frac{n}{2d}\right) = \frac{(\ln n)^4}{12d} > \frac{\ln n}{12} \to \infty$ (as $d < (\ln n)^3$ from Eqn. (19)). Thus we can choose a suitable constant $0 < \beta < 1$ (e.g., $\beta = \frac{1}{2}$) and apply the Chernoff bound in Lemma 2 to obtain:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[X > (1 - \beta)E[X]] \ge \lim_{n \to \infty} 1 - e^{-\frac{\beta^2 E[X]}{2}} = 1 \because E[X] \to \infty$$
(24)

Thus, as $n \to \infty$, the probability that some non-faulty node(s) fail to commit to the correct value tends towards 1:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[\text{ reliable broadcast fails}] \to 1$$

VIII. SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR RELIABLE BROADCAST

We now present a sufficient condition for the asymptotic achievability of reliable broadcast.

THEOREM 4: When $p < \frac{1}{2}$, and node degree $d \ge \max\{d_{min}, 16\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}\} = \max\{d_{min}, 8\frac{\ln n}{D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P)})\}$ (recall that $d_{min} = 8$ corresponding to r = 1), reliable broadcast is asymptotically achievable with probability 1. Note that when $\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)} \le \frac{16\ln n}{n}$, the degree exceeds total network size n, and thus the sufficient condition

ceases to be relevant, merely indicating that having a single-hop network suffices for reliable broadcast (which is the trivial sufficient condition for the assumed radio network model). Thus the sufficient condition is of interest only so long as $\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)} > \frac{16\ln n}{n}$.

a) $p \le o(\frac{1}{n})$: When the failure probability is so small as to fall in this range, the probability of even a single node failing approaches 0 asymptotically, and thus reliable broadcast is trivially ensured even with the minimum transmission range of 1. This may be seen thus:

$$Pr[\text{No failures; trivial broadcast}] = (1-p)^n$$
(25)

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[\text{No failures; trivial broadcast}] \ge \lim_{n \to \infty} (1-p)^n = e^{-\lim(np)} = 1 \text{ from Fact } 2$$
(26)

Region	x-extent	y-extent
$qnbd_A(a,b)$	$a \le x \le (a+r)$	$(b-r) \le y \le (b-1)$
$qnbd_B(a,b)$	$(a-r) \le x \le (a-1)$	$(b-r) \le y \le b$
$qnbd_C(a,b)$	$(a-r) \le x \le a$	$(b+1) \le y \le (b+r)$
$qnbd_D(a,b)$	$(a+1) \le x \le (a+r)$	$b \le y \le (b+r)$
$qnbd_{A'}(a,b)$	$(a+1) \le x \le (a+r)$	$(b-r) \le y \le b$
$qnbd_{B'}(a,b)$	$(a-r) \le x \le a$	$(b-r) \le y \le (b-1)$
$qnbd_{C'}(a,b)$	$(a-r) \le x \le (a-1)$	$b \le y \le (b+r)$
$qnbd_{D'}(a,b)$	$a \le x \le (a+r)$	$(b+1) \le y \le (b+r)$

TABLE I Spatial Extents of Quarter Neighborhoods

b) $p = \Omega(\frac{1}{n})$: We define a term called quarter-neighborhood of a node (x, y), and denote it by qnbd(x, y). We associate eight quarter-neighborhoods with each node: $qnbd_A$, $qnbd_B$, $qnbd_C$, $qnbd_D$, $qnbd_{A'}$, $qnbd_{B'}$, $qnbd_{C'}$, $qnbd_{D'}$. The quarter-neighborhoods for a node (a,b) are depicted in Figs. 3 and 4, and their spatial extents are tabulated in Table I. Observe that $qnbd_B(a,b) = qnbd'_A(a-r-1,b)$, $qnbd_C(a,b) = qnbd_A(a-r,b+r+1)$, and $qnbd_D(a,b) = qnbd'_A(a,b+r+1)$. Similarly, $qnbd_{B'}(a,b) = qnbd_A(a-r-1,b)$, $qnbd_{C'}(a,b) = qnbd_{A'}(a-r-1,b+r)$, and $qnbd_{D'}(a,b) = qnbd_A(a,b+r+1)$ Thus if we simply consider $qnbd_A(u)$ and $qnbd_{A'}(u) \forall$ nodes u, we will have considered all quarter-neighborhoods, i.e. the number of distinct (but not disjoint) quarter-neighborhoods is 2n. Henceforth, we shall sometimes use Q(x,y) to refer to $qnbd_A(x,y)$, and Q'(x,y) to refer to $qnbd_{A'}(x,y)$. The population of any qnbd is r(r+1), and since $d = 4r^2 + 4r = 4r(r+1)$, the qnbd population $= \frac{d}{4}$. We now state and prove the following result which is crucial to proving our sufficient condition for reliable broadcast:

THEOREM 5: If
$$p < \frac{1}{2}$$
, $d \ge \max\{d_{min}, 16\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}\} = \max\{d_{min}, 8\frac{\ln n}{D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P)})\}$, then:
$$\lim_{n \to \infty} Pr[\forall (x, y) \text{ less than } \frac{d}{8} \text{ faults in}$$
$$Q(x, y) \text{ and } Q'(x, y)] \to 1$$

Proof: As shown above, the population of any *qnbd* is $\frac{d}{4}$. Each node may fail independently with probability *p*.Let $Y_{(x,y)}$ be a random variable denoting the number of faulty nodes in Q(x,y). Then $E[Y_{(x,y)}] = p\frac{d}{4}$. Using $\delta = \frac{1}{2p} - 1$, we may then apply the relative entropy form of the Chernoff bound (Lemma 3) to $Y_{(x,y)} = \sum_{j \in nbd(x,y)} I_j$. Note that $d \ge \max\{d_{min}, 16\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}\} \ge 16\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}$. Thus, we obtain:

$$Pr[Y_{(x,y)} \ge \frac{d}{8}] \le e^{-\frac{d}{4}(\frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2p} + \frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)})}$$
(27)

$$\leq e^{-(\frac{16\ln n}{4(\ln\frac{1}{2p}+\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)})})(\frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2p}+\frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)})}$$
(28)

$$=e^{-2\ln n} = \frac{1}{n^2}$$
(29)

Similarly, setting $Y'_{(x,y)}$ be a random variable denoting the number of faulty nodes in Q'(x,y), we obtain that:

$$Pr[Y'_{(x,y)} \ge \frac{d}{8}] \le \frac{1}{n^2}$$
(30)

By application of union bound over all 2n distinct quarter-neighborhoods:

$$\therefore \lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[\forall (x, y), Y(x, y) < \frac{d}{8} \text{ and } Y'(x, y) < \frac{d}{8}]$$
(31)

$$\geq 1 - 2n\left(\frac{1}{n^2}\right) = 1 - \frac{2}{n} \to 1 \tag{32}$$

We now consider a simple broadcast protocol that is similar to the protocol described in [4] for the adversarial model:

- Initially, the source does a local broadcast of the message.
- Each neighbor *i* of the source immediately commits to the first value *v* it heard from the source, and then locally broadcasts it once in a *COMMITTED*(*i*, *v*) message.
- Hereafter, the following protocol is followed by each node $j \notin nbd(s)$: If $\frac{1}{2}r(r+1) + 1 = \frac{d}{8} + 1$ *COMMITTED*(i, v) message are received for a certain value v, from neighbors i all lying within a single *qnbd*, and not already committed to some value, commit to v, and locally broadcast a *COMMITTED*(j, v) message.

THEOREM 6: (Safety (Correctness)) The probability that a node shall commit to a wrong value by following the above protocol diminishes to 0 asymptotically.

Proof: If all Q(x,y) and Q'(x,y) have strictly less than $\frac{d}{8}$ faults, the correctness of the protocol proceeds as follows:

By the assumptions of *reliable local broadcast*, if *s* sends exactly one message, fault-free nodes in nbd(s) are guaranteed to receive it correctly. If *s* is faulty and sends more than one version of the message, fault-free nodes in nbd(s) receive both messages, and select the first one. Thus fault-free nodes in nbd(s) are guaranteed to commit to the correct value.

The rest of the proof is by contradiction. Consider the first fault-free node, say *j*, that makes a wrong decision to commit to a value *v*. From our previous assertion, *j* cannot be in nbd(s), and thus followed protocol rules for nodes that are not *s*'s neighbors. This implies that $\frac{d}{8} + 1$ of its neighbors within some *qnbd* must have broadcast a *COMMITTED* message for *v* (the *COMMITTED* messages were directly heard, leaving no place for doubt). All of these nodes cannot be faulty, as no more than $\frac{d}{8}$ nodes in any *qnbd* are faulty. Thus there was at least one fault-free node that committed to *v*. Since *j* is the first fault-free node to make a wrong decision, none of the fault-free nodes amongst the $\frac{d}{8} + 1$ nodes could have made a wrong decision. Thus *v* must indeed be the correct value.

We know that all Qnbd(x, y) have less than $\frac{d}{8}$ faults with probability 1 asymptotically, and hence the protocol also functions correctly with probability 1 asymptotically.

THEOREM 7: (Liveness (Completeness)) Each node is eventually able to commit to the (probabilistically) correct value.

Proof:

The proof proceeds by induction.

Base Case:

All honest nodes in nbd(0,0) are able to commit to the correct value. This follows trivially since they hear the origin directly, and we assume that address-spoofing is impossible.



Fig. 5. Node at P has a *qnbd* in nbd(a,b)

Inductive Hypothesis:

If all honest neighbors of a node located at (a,b) i.e. all honest nodes in nbd(a,b) are able to commit to the correct value, then all honest nodes in pnbd(a,b) are able to commit to the correct value.

Proof of Inductive Hypothesis:

We show that each node *P* in pnbd(a,b) - nbd(a,b) has one of $qnbd_A(P)$, $qnbd_B(P)$, $qnbd_C(P)$, $qnbd_D(P)$, $qnbd_{A'}(P)$, $qnbd_{B'}(P)$, $qnbd_{C'}(P)$, $qnbd_{D'}(P)$ fully contained in nbd(a,b). Since no more than $\frac{d}{8}$ of the nodes in a qnbd are faulty with probability 1 (asymptotically), this guarantees that the node will become aware of $\frac{d}{8} + 1$ nodes in nbd(a,b) having committed to a (the correct) value, and will also commit to it. The situation is depicted in Fig. 5 for $P \in \{(a-r+l,b+r+1)|1 \le l \le r\}$, for which $qnbd_A(P)$ lies in nbd(a,b). For all other locations, a similar argument holds.

IX. NECESSARY CONDITION FOR RANDOM NETWORKS

THEOREM 8: When failure probability
$$p \le \frac{1}{2} - \sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{n^{\frac{1}{32}}}}$$
, and $r(n,p) \le \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\max\{\ln n, \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}\}}$
 $Pr[\text{ reliable broadcast fails}] \to 1$

Proof: We separately consider the following two cases:

 $\ln n > \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}$: We know from the results of [17] that in a failure-free random network, $r(n) = \sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{\pi}}$ is necessary for connectivity (note that we are considering the network as being of area *n* to maintain consistency with the grid network formulation; this leads to a scaling of the result of [17]). When, $\ln n > \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}$, the condition in our theorem statement reduces to $r(n, p) \le \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\ln n} < \sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{\pi}}$. Thus, from the results of [17], the network is disconnected with some positive probability, and the necessary condition holds.

 $\ln n \le \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}$: As mentioned in the previous case, it is known from the results of [17], that even with p = 0, the *critical* transmission range is greater than $\frac{\sqrt{\ln n}}{2}$. Consider a subdivision of the network into disjoint square



Fig. 6. Necessary Condition for Random Networks: cell S

cells of area $a(n) = 81r^2(n,p)$, where $\frac{\sqrt{\ln n}}{2} \le r(n,p) \le \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}}$. Thus $\frac{81\ln n}{4} \le a(n) \le \frac{81\ln n}{4(\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)})}$ for the rest of the discussion.

LEMMA 9: Each cell contains at least $\frac{a(n)}{2}$ and at most $\frac{3a(n)}{2}$ nodes w.h.p.

Proof: Consider a particular cell S. Denote by X_i an indicator variable that is 1 if node *i* lies in S and is 0 otherwise. Then $Pr[X_i = 1] = \frac{a(n)}{n}$, and the X_i 's are all i.i.d. Let, $X = \sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i$. Then E[X] = a(n).

By applying the Chernoff bound from Lemma 2 (with $\beta = \frac{1}{2}$), it follows that:

$$Pr[X \le \frac{a(n)}{2}] \le \exp(-\frac{a(n)}{8}) \le \exp(-\frac{81\ln n}{32}) = \frac{1}{n^{\frac{81}{32}}}$$
(33)

By applying the Chernoff bound from Lemma 5 (with $\beta = \frac{1}{2}$), it follows that:

$$Pr[X \ge \frac{3a(n)}{2}] \le \exp(-\frac{a(n)}{12}) \le \exp(-\frac{81\ln n}{48}) = \frac{1}{n^{\frac{81}{48}}}$$
(34)

Thus the cell population n_s is least $\frac{a(n)}{2}$ and at most $\frac{3a(n)}{2}$ nodes with probability at least $1 - \frac{1}{n^{\frac{81}{52}}} - \frac{1}{n^{\frac{81}{52}}} \ge 1 - \frac{2}{n^{1.5}}$. Applying union bound over all $\frac{1}{a(n)} < n$ cells, this holds for all cells with probability at least $1 - \frac{2}{\sqrt{n}}$.

Event \mathcal{E}_o : Denote by event \mathcal{E}_o , the event that $\frac{a(n)}{2} \le n_s \le \frac{3a(n)}{2}$, for all cells. Then $Pr[\neg \mathcal{E}_o] \le \frac{2}{\sqrt{n}}$

Suppose \mathcal{E}_o holds. Fixing n_{s_i} for all cells \mathcal{S}_i in the network, events occurring entirely within each cell may hereafter be treated as being independent.

Divide each such cell further into 9 square sub-cells of area $A(n) = \frac{a(n)}{9} = 9r^2(n)$ each. Note that $\frac{9}{4} \ln n \le A(n) \le \frac{9 \ln n}{4(\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)})}$.

Consider a particular cell S, and focus on the center sub-cell of this cell (call it D). Then conditioned on the cell populations:

 $Pr[\mathcal{D} \text{ has no non-faulty node } |N_s = n_s, \mathcal{E}_o] \le (1 - (1 - p)\frac{A(n)}{a(n)})^{n_s} \le (1 - (1 - p)\frac{A(n)}{a(n)})^{\frac{a(n)}{2}} \le (1 - \frac{A(n)}{2a(n)})^{\frac{a(n)}{2}} (\because p < \frac{1}{2}) \le e^{-\frac{A(n)}{4}} \le e^{-\frac{9\ln n}{16}} = \frac{1}{n^{\frac{9}{16}}}$ (35)

Event \mathcal{E}_1 : Denote by event \mathcal{E}_1 , the event that in a given cell \mathcal{S} , the center sub-cell \mathcal{D} has at least one non-faulty node. Then $Pr[\neg \mathcal{E}_1 | \mathcal{E}_o] \leq \frac{1}{n^{\frac{9}{16}}}$.

Assuming there is at least one non-faulty node in \mathcal{D} , select one such node *j*. Consider its neighborhood, which is guaranteed to fall entirely within the cell S (Fig. 6). Also the area of the neighborhood is $A_1(n) = \pi r^2(n) \leq \frac{\pi \ln n}{4(\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)})} < \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}$. It is to be noted though that $A_1(n) = \pi r^2(n) \geq \frac{\pi \ln n}{4}$. Let *M* be the number of nodes other than *j* lying within this area (i.e., the number of neighbors of *j*). Thus $E[M|N_s = n_s, \mathcal{E}_o] = (n_s - 1)\left(\frac{A_1(n)}{a(n)}\right) \leq n_s\left(\frac{A_1(n)}{a(n)}\right)$.

It is not hard to see that $(1-\varepsilon)\frac{A_1(n)}{2} \leq (\frac{a(n)}{2}-1)\frac{A_1(n)}{a(n)} = \frac{A_1(n)}{2} - \frac{\pi}{81} \leq E[M|N_s = n_s, \mathcal{E}_o] \leq \frac{3A_1(n)}{2}$, for any arbitrarily small ε . Let us set $\varepsilon = (1-\frac{3}{\pi})$, to get that $E[M|N_s = n_s, \mathcal{E}_o] \geq \frac{(1-\varepsilon)A_1(n)}{2} \geq \frac{3\ln n}{8}$. Then, setting $(1+\beta)E[M|N_s = n_s, \mathcal{E}_o] = 4A_1(n)$, we get $\beta \geq \frac{4A_1(n)}{E[M|N_s = n_s, \mathcal{E}_o]} - 1 \geq \frac{8}{3} - 1 = \frac{5}{3}$. Noting that $\frac{e^{\beta}}{(1+\beta)^{1+\beta}}$ is a non-increasing function of β for all $\beta \geq 0^{-2}$, we then apply Lemma 4:

$$Pr[M \ge 4A_{1}(n)|N_{s} = n_{s}, \mathcal{E}_{o}] \le Pr[M \ge \frac{8E[M|N_{s} = n_{s}, \mathcal{E}_{o}]}{3}] \le \left(\frac{e^{\beta}}{(1+\beta)^{1+\beta}}\right)^{E[M|N_{s} = n_{s}, \mathcal{E}_{o}]} \\ \le \left(\frac{e^{\frac{5}{3}}}{(\frac{8}{3})^{\frac{8}{3}}}\right)^{(1-\epsilon)\frac{A_{1}(n)}{2}} \le \left(\frac{1}{e^{\frac{8}{3}(3\ln 2 - \ln 3) - \frac{5}{3}}}\right)^{\frac{3\ln n}{8}} < \left(\frac{1}{e^{\frac{2}{3}}}\right)^{\frac{3\ln n}{8}} = \frac{1}{n^{\frac{1}{4}}}$$
(36)

Event \mathcal{E}_2 : Denote by event \mathcal{E}_2 , the event that in a given cell \mathcal{S} , a chosen non-faulty node (if one exists) in center sub-cell \mathcal{D} has $m \leq 4A_1(n)$ neighbors. Then $Pr[\neg \mathcal{E}_2 | \mathcal{E}_o \land \mathcal{E}_1] \leq \frac{1}{n^4}$.

Assuming that $M = m \le 4A_1(n)$, let us now consider the probability that half or more of these neighbors of j are faulty.

If M = m = 0, then automatically the node *j* is isolated with probability 1. Thus, we only consider the case $M = m \ge 1$.

Given that there are M = m neighbors, and each may fail independently with probability p, let $I_{jk}(1 \le k \le m)$ denote the indicator variable corresponding to neighbor k of j (enumerated in some order), such that $I_{jk} = 1$ if k is faulty, and 0 otherwise. Then $Y_j = \sum I_{jk}$ denotes the number of failed neighbors of j. Y takes values from 0, 1, ..., m, and E[Y] = pd. $Pr[Y_j \ge \frac{m}{2}] = \sum_{i=\lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil}^{m} {m \choose i} p^i (1-p)^{(m-i)}$. Let us simply consider the event $Y_j = \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil$. Then we can apply the lower bound from Lemma 6. The variables $I_{jk}(1 \le k \le M)$ are drawn from $\chi = \{0, 1\}$ as per distribution P = Bernoulli(p), and the distribution corresponding to $Y_j = \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil$ is $Bernoulli(\lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil) = Bernoulli(q)$ where $q = \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil$, i.e., $\frac{1}{2} \le q \le \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2m}$ (we shall refer to this as Q_q). Let us denote the $Bernoulli(\frac{1}{2})$ distribution as $Q_{\frac{1}{2}}$.

²Let $f = \frac{e^{\beta}}{(1+\beta)^{1+\beta}}$. Set $g = \ln f = \beta - (1+\beta)\ln(1+\beta)$. Then: $\frac{dg}{d\beta} = 1 - \frac{1+\beta}{1+\beta} - \ln(1+\beta) = -\ln(1+\beta) \le 0$ for all $\beta \ge 0$. Since $f = e^g$, this implies that f is a non-increasing function of β for $\beta \ge 0$.

Since $\ln n \le \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}$, it follows that:

$$\ln n \le \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}} \implies \ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)} < 1 \implies p(1-p) > \frac{1}{4e} \implies p > \frac{1}{4e}$$
(37)

When m = 1:

$$Pr[Y_j = \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil] = Pr[Y_j = 1] = p \ge \frac{1}{4e} \ge \frac{1}{4e^2 n^{\frac{3}{16}}}$$
(38)

When m = 3, noting that $3p^2(1-p)$ is an increasing function of p for $p < \frac{1}{2}$:

$$Pr[Y_j = \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil] = Pr[Y_j = 2] = \binom{3}{2} p^2 (1-p) = 3p^2 (1-p) \ge 3\frac{1}{16e^2} (1-\frac{1}{4e}) \ge \frac{9}{64e^2} \ge \frac{1}{4e^2 n^{\frac{3}{16}}} \text{ for large } n \quad (39)$$

When *m* is even, it is trivially true that $D(Q_q||P) = D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P) \le D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P) + \frac{2}{m}$. For all odd $m \ge 5$, it can be shown that $D(Q_q||P) \le D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P) + \frac{2}{m}$ as follows:

$$\begin{split} D(\mathcal{Q}_{q}||P) &= \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2m}\right) \ln \frac{\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2m}}{p} + \left(\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2m}\right) \ln \frac{\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2m}}{1 - p} \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \frac{1}{m}\right) \left(\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \left(1 + \frac{1}{m}\right)\right) + \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{m}\right) \left(\ln \frac{1}{2(1 - p)} + \ln \left(1 - \frac{1}{m}\right)\right) \\ &= \left[\frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{1}{2p} + \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{1}{2(1 - p)}\right] + \left[\frac{1}{2m} \ln \frac{1}{2p} - \frac{1}{2m} \ln \frac{1}{2(1 - p)}\right] + \left[\frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \frac{1}{m}\right) \ln \left(1 + \frac{1}{m}\right) + \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{m}\right) \ln \left(1 - \frac{1}{m}\right)\right] \\ &= \left[\frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{1}{2p} + \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{1}{2(1 - p)}\right] + \frac{1}{2m} \ln \frac{1 - p}{p} + \left[\frac{1}{2} \ln \left(1 + \frac{1}{m}\right) \left(1 - \frac{1}{m}\right) + \frac{1}{2m} \ln \frac{\left(1 + \frac{1}{m}\right)}{\left(1 - \frac{1}{m}\right)}\right] \\ &= D(\mathcal{Q}_{\frac{1}{2}}||P) + \frac{1}{2m} \ln \frac{1 - p}{p} + \frac{1}{2} \ln \left(1 - \frac{1}{m^{2}}\right) + \frac{1}{2m} \ln \left(\frac{m + 1}{m - 1}\right) \\ &\leq D(\mathcal{Q}_{\frac{1}{2}}||P) + \frac{\ln (4e)}{2m} + \frac{1}{2m} \ln \left(1 + \frac{2}{m - 1}\right) \text{ from } Eqn.(37)) \\ &\leq D(\mathcal{Q}_{\frac{1}{2}}||P) + \frac{1 + \ln 4}{2m} + \frac{1}{2m} \left(\frac{2}{m - 3}\right) \left(\because \ln \left(1 + \frac{2}{m - 1}\right) \le \frac{\frac{2}{m - 1}}{1 - \frac{2}{m - 1}} \text{ (from Fact 3)} \\ &\leq D(\mathcal{Q}_{\frac{1}{2}}||P) + \frac{\ln 4 + 2}{2m} \left(\because \frac{2}{m - 3} \le 1\right) \\ &\leq D(\mathcal{Q}_{\frac{1}{2}}||P) + \frac{2}{m} \frac{1}{m} \left(\because \frac{2}{m - 3} \le 1\right) \end{aligned}$$

We are applying Lemma 6 to Bernoulli variables. Hence $|\chi| = 2$, and $\frac{1}{(m+1)^{|\chi|}} = \frac{1}{(m+1)^2} \ge \frac{1}{4m^2} = \frac{1}{4}e^{-2\ln m}$ (for all $m \ge 1$).

Note that $m \le 4A_1(n) \le \frac{4\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}} \le \frac{4\ln n}{4(\frac{1}{2}-p)^2} \le n^{\frac{1}{32}}$ from Fact 5.

Thus, we obtain that for $m \neq 1,3$:

$$Pr[Y_{j} \ge \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil] \ge Pr[Y_{j} = \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil]$$

$$\ge \frac{1}{(m+1)^{|\chi|}} e^{-m(D(Q_{q}||P))}$$

$$\ge \frac{1}{(m+1)^{|\chi|}} e^{-m(D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P) + \frac{2}{m})}$$

$$\ge \frac{1}{(m+1)^{|\chi|}} e^{-m(D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P) - 2}$$

$$= \frac{1}{(m+1)^{2}e^{2}} e^{-m(D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P))} \ge \frac{1}{4e^{2}} e^{-m(D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P)) - 2\ln m}$$

$$> \frac{1}{4e^{2}} e^{-(\frac{\ln n}{4(\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)})})(\frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{1}{2p} + \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}) - \frac{1}{16} \ln n}$$

$$= \frac{1}{4e^{2}} e^{-\frac{2}{16} \ln n - \frac{1}{16} \ln n} \ge \frac{1}{4e^{2}n^{\frac{3}{16}}}$$
(41)

From Eqns. 38, 39, and 41, we obtain that, for all $m \ge 1$:

$$Pr[Y_j \ge \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil] \ge Pr[Y_j = \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil] \ge \frac{1}{4e^2n^{\frac{3}{16}}}$$

$$\tag{42}$$

Event \mathcal{E}_3 : Denote by event \mathcal{E}_3 , the event that in a given cell \mathcal{S} , a chosen non-faulty node (if one exists) in center sub-cell \mathcal{D} has half or more faulty neighbors. Then $Pr[\neg \mathcal{E}_3 | \mathcal{E}_o \land \mathcal{E}_1 \land \mathcal{E}_2] \leq 1 - \frac{1}{4e^2n^{\frac{3}{16}}}$. Then, assuming that event \mathcal{E}_o indeed held, the probability that one of events $\mathcal{E}_1, \mathcal{E}_2, \mathcal{E}_3$ did not occur can be

bounded as follows:

$$Pr[\neg(\mathcal{E}_{1} \land \mathcal{E}_{2} \land \mathcal{E}_{3})|\mathcal{E}_{o}] \leq Pr[\neg\mathcal{E}_{1}|\mathcal{E}_{o}] + Pr[\mathcal{E}_{1}|\mathcal{E}_{o}]Pr[\neg\mathcal{E}_{2}|\mathcal{E}_{1} \land \mathcal{E}_{o}] + Pr[\mathcal{E}_{1} \land \mathcal{E}_{2}|\mathcal{E}_{o}]Pr[\neg\mathcal{E}_{3}|\mathcal{E}_{o} \land \mathcal{E}_{1} \land \mathcal{E}_{2})]$$

$$\leq Pr[\neg\mathcal{E}_{1}|\mathcal{E}_{o}] + Pr[\neg\mathcal{E}_{2}|\mathcal{E}_{o} \land \mathcal{E}_{1}] + Pr[\neg\mathcal{E}_{3}|\mathcal{E}_{o} \land \mathcal{E}_{1} \land \mathcal{E}_{2}]$$

$$\leq \frac{1}{n^{\frac{9}{16}}} + \frac{1}{n^{\frac{1}{4}}} + (1 - \frac{1}{4e^{2}n^{\frac{3}{16}}})$$

$$= 1 - (\frac{1}{4e^{2}n^{\frac{3}{16}}} - \frac{1}{n^{\frac{9}{16}}} - \frac{1}{n^{\frac{1}{4}}}) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{8e^{2}n^{\frac{3}{16}}} \text{for large } n$$

$$(43)$$

Thus, conditioned on \mathcal{E}_o , with probability at least $\frac{1}{8e^2n^{\frac{3}{16}}}$, there is such a node x which has half or more faulty neighbors. Denote by I_j , an indicator variable which is 1 if this event happens for the centre-subcell \mathcal{D} of a given

cell S_j . Then $\Pr[I_j = 1 | \mathcal{E}_o] \ge \frac{1}{8e^2 n^{\frac{3}{16}}}$. Recall again, that once we fixed all the cell populations n_i , the considered events in each cell are independent of each other. The number h of disjoint cells S_j is at least $\left(\frac{|\sqrt{n}|}{9r(n)}\right)^2 \ge \frac{n}{2} \frac{n}{(\frac{81\ln n}{4\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)})}} = \frac{2n(\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)})}{81\ln n}$ for large n. Substituting from Fact 6, we can thus see that $h \ge \frac{8n(\frac{1}{2}-p)^2}{81\ln n} \ge \frac{8n^{1-\frac{1}{32}}}{81} = \frac{8n^{\frac{31}{32}}}{81}$ (since $p \le \frac{1}{2} - \sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{n^{\frac{1}{32}}}}$.

Let I'_i be an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the node x in center subcell of cell S_i is non-faulty but commits to a wrong value. From Theorem 1, we know that if a non-faulty node has half or more faulty neighbors, it will commit to the wrong value with probability at least $\frac{1}{2}$. Thus $Pr[I'_j = 1 | \mathcal{E}_o] \ge \frac{1}{2}Pr[I_j = 1 | \mathcal{E}_o] \ge \frac{1}{16e^2n^{\frac{3}{16}}}$. Let *X* be a random variable indicating the number of cells S_j in which we were able to select a non-faulty node

x, which happened to have half or more faulty neighbors, and which commits to the wrong value.

Then $X = \sum I'_j$, and $E[X|\mathcal{E}_o] = \sum Pr[I'_j = 1|\mathcal{E}_o] \ge \frac{1}{16e^2n^{\frac{3}{16}}}(h) = \frac{1}{16e^4n^{\frac{3}{16}}}\frac{8n^{\frac{31}{32}}}{81} \ge \frac{n^{\frac{25}{32}}}{162e^2}$. Also, since we are conditioning on cell populations $n_{\mathcal{S}_j}$, the indicator variables I'_j are all independent, once the $n_{\mathcal{S}_j}$ are fixed.

Thus we can choose an appropriate constant $0 < \beta < 1$ (e.g., set $\beta = \frac{1}{2}$) and apply the Chernoff bound in Lemma 2 to obtain:

$$\Pr[X < \frac{E[X|\mathcal{E}_{o}]}{2}|\mathcal{E}_{o}] \le e^{-\frac{E[X\mathcal{E}_{o}|\mathcal{E}_{o}]}{8}} \le e^{-\frac{n^{\frac{2}{32}}}{162(8e^{2})}}$$

Applying union bound, we obtain that:

$$\Pr[X \ge \frac{E[X]}{2}] \ge 1 - (\Pr[\neg \mathcal{E}_o] + \Pr[X < \frac{E[X]}{2} | \mathcal{E}_o] \ge 1 - \frac{2}{\sqrt{n}} - e^{-\frac{n\frac{52}{162(8e^2)}}{162(8e^2)}}$$

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Thus, the probability that some non-faulty nodes commit to an incorrect value will tend to 1 as n tends to infinity. Resultantly:

$$\lim_{n\to\infty} \Pr[\text{ reliable broadcast fails}] \to 1$$

Corollary 3: The critical average degree for reliable broadcast in a random network with Byzantine failure

 $\begin{array}{l} \text{Probability } p < \frac{1}{2}, \text{ is expressible as } \Omega(\frac{\ln n}{\frac{1}{2} - p + \frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}}) \text{ or } \Omega(\frac{\ln n}{(\frac{1}{2} - p)^2}). \\ \text{Proof: Note that when } p < \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2} - p + \frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)} = \Theta(\min\{1, \ln\frac{1}{2p} + \ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}\}). \text{ Similarly, } (\frac{1}{2} - p)^2 = \Theta(\min\{1, \ln\frac{1}{2p} + \ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}\}). \text{ In Theorem 8, we proved that } d_{critical} = \Omega(\max\{\ln n, \frac{\ln n}{\ln\frac{1}{2p} + \ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}}\}) = \Phi(\min\{1, \ln\frac{1}{2p} + \ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}\}). \end{array}$ $\Omega(\frac{\ln n}{\min\{1,\ln\frac{1}{2p}+\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}\}})$. The result thus follows.

X. SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR RANDOM NETWORKS

We obtain a sufficient condition for a network of n randomly deployed nodes, based on the sufficient condition for the grid network model. To maintain consistency with the grid network formulation, we assume a toroidal region of area $\sqrt{n} \propto \sqrt{n}$, with n nodes located uniformly at random. The average degree of a node is the average number of the remaining n-1 nodes that fall within its neighborhood (recall we are using L_{∞} distance metric), i.e., $d_{avg}(n,p) = \frac{(n-1)(2r(n,p))^2}{n} \approx 4r^2(n,p)$ for large n.

THEOREM 9: When failure probability $p < \frac{1}{2}$, and $r(n,p) \ge \sqrt{\frac{100 \ln n}{\frac{1}{2} - p + \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}}$, reliable broadcast is asymptotically achievable in the random network model with high probability.

Proof: At the outset, we make the observation that if $r(n,p) = \sqrt{n}$, all nodes are neighbors, and trivially broadcast is achievable. Thus this result is of interest only so long as $r(n, p) < \sqrt{n}$.

In light of Fact 1:

$$D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||p) = \frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2p} + \frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{2}(1-2p) + \frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} - p + \frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}$$
(44)

Also, since $p < \frac{1}{2}$:

$$0 < \frac{1}{2} - p + \frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)} \le \frac{1}{2}(1-\ln 2) < 1$$
(45)

Similar to grid networks, we use a notion of quarter-neighborhoods. For a given broadcast instance, we again use relative coordinates by treating the source's coordinates as (0,0). With some abuse of the grid network notation introduced in Section II, we can extend the notion of nbd(x, y), to include all nodes within distance r of point (x, y) (regardless of whether or not there is a node at (x, y)), where x and y are real numbers. The notion of pnd(x, y) is also similarly extended to all points (x, y).

Note that in this model, a node's (or point's) coordinates are real numbers. We thus associate eight quarterneighborhoods with each node, with spatial extents as in Table I, except that now x and y must be treated as real numbers. Also, now it is not possible to assert that there are only 2n distinct quarter-neighborhoods. Thus, all eight quarter-neighborhoods of a node must be treated as distinct³, yielding 8n quarter-neighborhoods in all.

The quarter-neigborhoods are axis-parallel rectangles of area $r(n,p)(r(n,p)-1) \ge \frac{r^2(n,p)}{2}$ (for $r(n,p) \ge 2$). Then, $\frac{400\ln n}{\frac{1}{2}-p+\frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}} \approx \frac{400\ln n}{1}, \text{ then we can apply Lemma 8 for all axis-parallel rectangles of area <math>r(n,p)(r(n,p)-1) \ge \frac{50\ln n}{\frac{1}{2}-p+\frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}} \approx \frac{100\ln n}{1-\ln 2}, \text{ to obtain that they all have at least } \frac{50\ln n}{\frac{1}{2}-p+\frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}} = 50\ln n > \frac{25\ln n}{\frac{1}{2}-p+\frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}} > \frac{50\ln n}{1-\ln 2} \text{ nodes,}$ with probability at least $1 - \frac{50 \ln n}{n} \rightarrow 1$.

Thus all such rectangles are non-empty. Also:

$$\frac{25\ln n}{\frac{1}{2} - p + \frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}} \ge \frac{25\ln n}{D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||p)} > \frac{8\ln n}{D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||p)}$$
(46)

Hence all the quarter-neighborhoods have at least $\frac{8 \ln n}{D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}} || p)}$ nodes (which is the quarter-neighborhood population in the grid network case). Then using a proof argument similar to Theorem 5, one can prove the following theorem:

THEOREM 10: If
$$p < \frac{1}{2}$$
, and $r(n,p) \ge \sqrt{\frac{100 \ln n}{\frac{1}{2} - p + \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}}$, then

 $\lim Pr[$ all $8n \ qnbds$ have non-faulty majority $] \rightarrow 1$

Thus, one can use a broadcast protocol similar to that for grid networks (a node commits to a value if it is received from half or more nodes in some quarter-neighborhood), and, for all broadcast sources, and instances, the correctness and completeness continue to hold, as follows:

Safety (Correctness): Relying on Theorem 10, we can apply a proof argument similar to Theorem 6.

Liveness (Completeness): The proof uses the an inductive argument similar to the proof of Theorem 7, except that the terms nbd(x,y), pnd(x,y) and quarter-neighborhood must be interpreted as per their re-definition in this section. In the base case, all neighbors of the source (which is at (0,0)) commit to the correct value trivially. In the inductive step, one can show that if all nodes in nbd(x, y) (as per the re-defined notation) have comitted to the correct value, all nodes in pnd(x,y) - nbd(x,y) have some *qnbd* contained in nbd(x,y), and can thus commit to the value received from a majority of nodes in this qnbd.

Since the area within range of a node is $(2r)^2 \leq 4r^2$ (for the valid domain of r values) in the L_{∞} metric, the result indicates that an average node degree d_{avg} of $\frac{400 \ln n}{\frac{1}{2} - p + \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}$ suffices for reliable broadcast. Hence the *critical* average node degree $d_{critical}^{avg}$ is $O(\frac{\ln n}{\frac{1}{2} - p + \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}})$.

Corollary 4: The critical average degree for reliable broadcast in a random network with Byzantine failure

 $\begin{array}{l} \text{probability } p < \frac{1}{2} \text{ is } O(\max\{\ln n, \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}\}) \text{ or } O(\frac{\ln n}{\min\{1, \ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}\}}) \text{ or } O(\frac{\ln n}{(\frac{1}{2}-p)^2}). \\ \text{Proof: Note that when } p < \frac{1}{2} : \frac{1}{2} - p + \frac{1}{2}\ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)} = \Theta(\min\{1, \ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}\}) = \Theta((\frac{1}{2}-p)^2). \\ \text{ In Theorem 9, } we \text{ proved that } d_{critical} = O(\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}}). \\ \text{ Thus, it follows that } d_{critical} = O(\frac{\ln n}{(\frac{1}{2}-p)^2}). \\ \text{ Thus, it follows that } d_{critical} = O(\frac{\ln n}{(\frac{1}{2}-p)^2}). \\ \end{array}$ result thus follows,

³Note that distinct does not mean disjoint.

⁴A more intuitive way of viewing the result is that *critical* degree is $O(\max\{\ln n, \frac{\ln n}{D(Q_{\perp}||P)}\})$.



Fig. 7. Relationship between L_{∞} and L_2 neighborhoods

XI. CONDITIONS IN EUCLIDEAN METRIC

We show that our results derived for L_{∞} metric continue to hold for L_2 metric, with only the constants in the theta notation changing.

LEMMA 10: If reliable broadcast is achievable asymptotically in L_{∞} for all $r \ge r_{min}$, then it is achievable asymptotically in L_2 for all $r \ge r_{min}\sqrt{2}$.

Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that, for a given failure configuration, broadcast is asymptotically achievable in L_{∞} for all $r \ge r_{min}$ but is not asymptotically achievable for all $r \ge r_{min}\sqrt{2}$ in L_2 . Observe that it is possible to circumscribe a L_{∞} neighborhood of range r by a L_2 neighborhood of range $r\sqrt{2}$ (Fig. 7). Hence the non-faulty nodes in an L_2 network of transmission range $r\sqrt{2}$ can be made to simulate the operation of nodes in a L_{∞} network with range r (as the L_{∞} neighborhood is fully contained within the L_2 neighborhood). Also, given that this is a network of known topology, with no address spoofing allowed, the faulty nodes cannot gain any unfair advantage, by not simulating the the L_{∞} network. This implies that if broadcast is achievable in the L_{∞} network of range $r\sqrt{2}$. If there is some $r \ge r_{min}$ for which we can achieve broadcast in the L_{∞} network asymptotically, but not in the the L_2 network of range $r\sqrt{2}$, we obtain a contradiction, as achievability in the L_{∞} network would imply achievability in the L_2 network.

LEMMA 11: If reliable broadcast fails asymptotically in L_{∞} for all $r \leq r_{min}$, then it fails asymptotically in L_2 for all $r \leq r_{min}$.

Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that broadcast fails asymptotically in L_{∞} for range r, but does not fail in L_2 for range r. Observe that an L_{∞} neighborhood of transmission range r circumscribes an L_2 neighborhood of range r (Fig. 7). Thus, for any given failure configuration, if broadcast succeeds in the the L_2 network of range r, so can it in the L_{∞} network of radius r, as we could simply make the fault-free nodes in the L_{∞} network simulate the behavior of nodes in the L_2 network. Hence, if broadcast does not fail in the L_2 network of range $r \leq r_{min}$, it will not fail in the L_{∞} network of range $r \leq r_{min}$. This yields a contradiction.

XII. NON-TOROIDAL NETWORKS

We used the assumption that the network is toroidal to avoid edge effects. However, one can see that the results would continue to hold even if the network were spread over a non-toroidal rectilinear domain. The necessary condition would continue to hold, since the degree of nodes at the edges can be no more more than the degree of nodes towards the center, and if reliable broadcast is impossible even with the assumption of equal degree for all nodes, it must certainly be impossible when some nodes (those at the edges) have a smaller degree.

The sufficient condition continues to hold since the described protocol relies on information from quarterneighborhoods, and it can be seen that even the nodes at the edges have at least one quarter-neighborhood within the network region.

Crash-Stop Failures/Connectivity

XIII. RELATED WORK

Conditions for connectivity and coverage have been formulated in the context of different network models. In [17], it was proved that in a unit area network with uniformly distributed node placement, where nodes have a common transmission radius r, such that $\pi r^2 = \frac{(\log n + c(n))}{n}$, the network is asymptotically connected with probability one iff $c(n) \to \infty$. In [18], an alternate model was considered whereby randomly deployed nodes may modulate their transmission power (and hence range) to ensure that they have a certain number of neighbors. It was proved that each node must be connected to $\Theta(\log n)$ neighbors for asymptotic connectivity with probability one. Recently, necessary and sufficient conditions for asymptotic connectivity in a network with low duty cycle sensors have been formulated in [19].

A grid network model was considered in [1] where nodes are located at grid locations on a square grid, but may fail independently. Nodes have a common transmission range r. The probability of not failing is specified as p, and it is shown that a sufficient condition for connectivity and coverage is that transmission range r must be set to ensure that node degree is $c_1(\frac{\log n}{p})$ (for some constant c_1). It is also shown that a necessary condition for coverage (and hence for joint coverage and connetivity) is that node degree be at least $c_2(\frac{\log n}{p})$ (for another constant c_2 . A fallacy in the above necessary condition was pointed out by [20], and a subsequent correction [21] by the authors of [1] presents examples illustrating that the necessary condition may fail to hold for certain subranges of p. The issue of coverage has been examined in detail in [20] for random, grid, and poisson deployments. However, the necessary and sufficient conditions formulated by them take a more complex form, and do not point to a single f(n,p) such that a degree of $\Theta(f(n,p))$ is both necessary and sufficient for asymptotic coverage. Besides, the necessary condition is formulated for the specific case when $\lim p \to 0$.

Our results for crash-stop failures are closely related to the results of [1]. However, we prove that, given a *failure* probability p, it is necessary and sufficient to have a degree of $\Theta(d_{min} + \frac{\log n}{\log \frac{1}{p}})$ for both connectivity and coverage. Expressed in the notation of [1], we stipulate a degree of $\Theta(d_{min} + \frac{\log n}{\log \frac{1}{1-p}})$. Our results diverge considerably from those of [1] when the failure probability becomes extremely small, and thus our necessary conditions would hold in a certain subdomain where that of [1] would not. However, there is a small sub-domain of p (when p tends towards 1) in which our necessary conditions also cease to hold, as with the conditions of [1]. Besides, we work in the L_{∞} distance metric, and then map the results to L_2 . This yields much simpler proofs. We also remark that our joint sufficient condition for connectivity and coverage is actually sufficient for 9-coverage and not merely 1-coverage (where *k*-coverage implies that each point is covered by at least *k* non-faulty nodes). It is noteworthy that similar results may be derived from analysis presented in [22] regarding the feasible rate in a sensor network, although no statement has been made in [22] in this regard.

XIV. NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY

We briefly describe here notation and terminology that shall be used in this paper. Nodes can identified by their grid location i.e. (x, y) denotes the node at (x, y). The neighborhood of (x, y) comprises all nodes within distance r of (x, y) and is denoted as nbd(x, y). The degree of each node is referred to as d. In L_{∞} metric, $d = 4r^2 + 4r$, while the size of a neighborhood (including the neighborhood center) is $d + 1 = 4r^2 + 4r + 1$. The diameter of the network (in terms of distance, and not number of hops) is referred to as D. If n is a perfect square, $D = \sqrt{n}$.

XV. NECESSARY CONDITION FOR CONNECTIVITY

THEOREM 11: When $p < 1 - \frac{1}{\ln n}$, if $r(n,p) < \max\{1, \frac{1}{4}\sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}}}\}$ (yielding node degree $d(n,p) < \max\{d_{\min}, \frac{\ln n}{2\ln \frac{1}{p}}\}$):

$$\lim Pr[\text{ disconnection}] = 1$$

Proof: It is obvious that the minimum transmission range required for connectivity is 1, yielding $d = d_{min} = 8$ (in L_{∞} metric), else the degree of all nodes is 0 (except in the case when all nodes are faulty, and connectivity becomes irrelevant). Thus, we only focus on the case where $\frac{1}{4}\sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}}} > 1$. In this scenario $r(n,p) < \max\{1, \frac{1}{4}\sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}}}\} \implies r(n,p) < \frac{1}{4}\sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}}}$.

We show that the network is asymptotically disconnected with probability 1 if $r < \frac{1}{4}\sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}}}$, as long as $p \le 1 - \frac{1}{\ln n}$. It is evident that in the L_{∞} metric, having $r(n,p) < \frac{1}{4}\sqrt{\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}}}$ yields a node degree $d(n,p) = 4r^2 + 4r \le 8r^2 < \frac{\ln n}{2\ln \frac{1}{p}}$. Consider a particular node j in the network. Then, if j is non-faulty, but all its neighbors are faulty, we have a potential disconnection event. Given that there are d neighbors, and each may fail independently with probability p, the probability that j does not fail, but all nodes in nbd(j) fail, is $(1-p)p^d$.

Since $p \le 1 - \frac{1}{\ln n}$, we obtain that:

$$1 - p \ge \frac{1}{\ln n} \tag{47}$$

 $Pr[A \text{ given node } j \text{ is non-faulty, but isolated}] \ge Pr[j \text{ is non-faulty and all neighbors of } j \text{ are faulty}]$

$$= (1-p)p^{d} \ge \frac{1}{\ln n} p^{\frac{\ln n}{2\ln \frac{1}{p}}} = \frac{1}{\ln n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}\ln n}$$
(48)
$$\ge \frac{(\ln n)^{3}}{n} \text{for large } n$$

Note the following:

$$d < \frac{\ln n}{2\ln\frac{1}{p}} \le \frac{\ln n}{2(1-p)} \le \frac{(\ln n)^2}{2} (\text{ from Fact 1 and Eqn. (47)})$$
(49)

Let us mark out a subset of nodes j such that the neighborhoods of these nodes are all disjoint, as in Fig. 8. Then, from Fact 7, the number of such nodes that we may obtain is at least $\frac{n}{2d}$ for large n.

Let I_j be an indicator variable that takes value 1 if j is non-faulty but isolated. Then $Pr[I_j = 1] \ge \frac{(\ln n)^3}{n}$, and all I_j 's are i.i.d.

Let *X* be a random variable denoting the number of nodes from the chosen set that are non-faulty and isolated. Then $X = \sum I_j$, and $E[X] \ge \frac{(\ln n)^3}{n} (\frac{n}{2d}) \ge \frac{(\ln n)^3}{(\ln n)^2} = \ln n$. We can thus set $\beta = \frac{1}{2}$ in the Chernoff bound of Lemma 2, and obtain that:

$$Pr[X > \frac{\ln n}{2}] \ge 1 - e^{-\frac{\ln n}{8}} = 1 - \frac{1}{n^{\frac{1}{8}}}$$
(50)

Thus, for $p < 1 - \frac{1}{\ln n}$:

 $\lim Pr[$ At least two non-faulty nodes are isolated] = 1.

Hence a broadcast from one such node will not be received by the other node. This result can actually be extended and shown to hold for a slightly larger range of p values.



Fig. 8. Nodes having disjoint neighborhoods

We also briefly touch upon the range fo p values satisfying $1 - p = o(\frac{1}{n})$. When the failure probability p is so high, we obtain the following:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[\text{ Any node is non-faulty}] = \lim_{n \to \infty} 1 - p^n = \lim_{n \to \infty} 1 - (1 - (1 - p))^n = 1 - e^{-\lim(n(1-p))} = e^0 = 0 \text{ from Fact } 2$$
(51)

Thus the issue of connectivity is irrelevant.

XVI. NECESSARY CONDITION FOR COVERAGE

Since the connectivity condition proof is easily adaptable to also provide a necessary condition for coverage, we do so in this section. Recall that the network is considered covered if each point in the network region falls within range of at least one non-faulty node.

THEOREM 12: When
$$p < 1 - \frac{1}{\ln n}$$
, if $r(n, p) < \max\{\frac{1}{2}, \sqrt{\frac{c \ln n}{8 \ln \frac{1}{p}}}\}$, where $c < \frac{8}{9}$ is a suitably chosen constant:
$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[\text{Some point is not covered}] \to 1$$

When $1 - p = o(\frac{1}{n})$, all nodes are faulty w.h.p., and the network is trivially not covered.

Proof: Since the grid comprises unit squares, it is obvious that r must be at least $\frac{1}{2}$, else some points between the lattice will not be covered. We handle two subranges of p separately.

a) $p < 1 - \frac{1}{\ln n}$: The proof relies on subdivision of the network into disjoint neighborhoods, as in Fig. 8. From Fact 7, the number of such neighborhoods obtained is at least $\frac{n}{2d}$ for large *n*.

If there exists at least one neighborhood with absolutely no nodes alive (neither the neighborhood center nor its neighbors), then the center of that neighborhood is not covered. Thus we seek to determine the probability of such an event.

We begin by choosing a positive constant c such that $\frac{9}{8}c\ln n \le \ln n - 3\ln\ln n$, for sufficiently large n. In general any constant $0 < c \le \frac{8}{9} - \varepsilon$ will satisfy this property for large n.

Suppose $r < \sqrt{\frac{c \ln n}{8 \ln \frac{1}{p}}}$. Then $d = 4r^2 + 4r \le 8r^2 = \frac{c \ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}} < c(\ln n)^2 < (\ln n)^2$ (from Fact 1).

The neighborhood population is given by $d+1 = 4r^2 + 4r + 1 \le 4r^2 + 4r^2 + r^2 = 9r^2$, for $n \ge 1$. Thus $d+1 \le \frac{9c \ln n}{8 \ln \frac{1}{p}}$ Let I_j be an indicator variable that takes value 1 if there is no alive node in the neighborhood centered at node j, and value 0 otherwise.

Then $Pr[X_j = 1] = p^{d+1} \ge p^{\frac{9}{8}c\frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}}} \ge \frac{(\ln n)^3}{n}$ (from our choice of *c*).

Let $X = \sum I_j$ be a random variable indicating the number of these disjoint neighborhoods with no alive node. From Fact 7, there are at least $\frac{n}{2d}$ such neighborhoods for large *n*. Then $E[X] \ge \frac{(\ln n)^3}{n} (\frac{n}{2d}) \ge \frac{(\ln n)^3}{2d} \ge \frac{(\ln n)^3}{2(\ln n)^2} = \frac{\ln n}{2}$. Application of the Chernoff bound from Lemma 2 with $\beta = \frac{1}{2}$ yields:

$$Pr[X \le \frac{\ln n}{4}] \le Pr[X \le \frac{E[X]}{2}] \le \exp(-\frac{E[X]}{8}) \to 0$$
(52)

Thus there is are some uncovered points with probability 1, as $n \rightarrow \infty$.

Similar to the necessary condition for connectivity, observe that the proof can be extended to hold for a somewhat larger range of p values, with suitable adjustment to the constant.

b) $1-p = o(\frac{1}{n})$: Thus $n(1-p) \to 0$. We obtain that Pr[no nodes alive $] = p^n = (1-(1-p))^n$. As $n \to \infty$, the following holds:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[\text{some point not covered}] \ge \Pr[\text{no node alive}]$$
(53)

$$= \lim_{n \to \infty} (1 - (1 - p))^n = e^{-\lim(n(1 - p))} = e^0 = 1$$
 from Fact 2 (54)

Thus the network is trivially not covered, regardless of transmission range.

XVII. SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CONNECTIVITY AND COVERAGE

We now present a sufficient condition for the asymptotic existence of both connectivity and coverage. It is thus also a sufficient condition for each of them individually.

THEOREM 13: When
$$r(n,p) \ge \max\{1, \sqrt{\frac{8\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}}}\}$$
:
$$\lim_{n \to \infty} Pr[\text{ the network is connected and covered }] \to 1$$

Proof:

a) $p = o(\frac{1}{n})$: When the failure probability is so small as to fall in this range, the probability of even a single node failing approaches 0 asymptotically, and thus connectivity and coverage is trivially ensured even with the minimum transmission range of 1. This may be seen thus:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[\text{No failures;full connectivity/coverage}] \ge \lim_{n \to \infty} (1-p)^n = e^{-\lim np} = e^0 = 1 \text{ from Fact } 2$$
(55)

b) $p = \Omega(\frac{1}{n})$: Consider the subdivision of the grid as depicted in Fig. 9, so that the resulting cells have x-extents (and also y-extents) 0 to a, a+1 to a+b, a+b+1 to 2a+b+1, 2a+b+2 to 2a+2b+1, and so on, where $a = \lfloor \frac{r}{2} \rfloor$ and $b = r - a = r - \lfloor \frac{r}{2} \rfloor$. Then, each node is within range of all other nodes in the cells adjoining its own. Thus it is obvious that if each square has at least one non-faulty node, there exists a connected backbone that covers all points, and hence all nodes. Thus all non-faulty nodes are connected to each other via this backbone. The



Fig. 9. Subdivision of network into cells



Fig. 10. Relationship between L_{∞} and L_2 neighborhoods

dimensions of the cells thus obtained can be $(a+1)^2$, (a+1)b or b^2 . Since $a+1 = \lfloor \frac{r}{2} \rfloor + 1 \ge \frac{r}{2}$, and $b = r - \lfloor \frac{r}{2} \rfloor \ge \frac{r}{2}$, the population k of any cell satisfies $k \ge \frac{r^2}{4}$, and the maximum possible number of cells $m \le \frac{4n}{r^2}$. Then:

$$Pr[$$
 no non-faulty node in a given cell $] = p^k \le p^{\frac{r^2}{4}}$ (56)

Let us choose $r \ge \sqrt{\frac{8 \ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}}}$. Then:

$$Pr[\text{no non-faulty node in a given cell}] \le p^{\frac{r^2}{4}} \le p^{\frac{2\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}}} = e^{-2\ln n} = \frac{1}{n^2}$$
 (57)

The total number of cells is at most $\frac{4n}{r^2} \leq n$. Thus, by applying a union bound over all cells:

$$Pr[\text{at least 1 non-faulty node in each cell}] \ge 1 - \frac{1}{n}$$
 (58)

Since this condition ensures connectivity and coverage, we obtain that:

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr[\text{network is connected and covered}] \to 1$$
(59)

XVIII. CONDITIONS IN EUCLIDEAN METRIC

We show that our results derived for L_{∞} metric continue to hold for L_2 metric, with only the constants in the theta notation changing.

LEMMA 12: If the network is asymptotically connected (covered) in L_{∞} for all $r \ge r_{min}$, then the network is connected (covered) asymptotically in L_2 for all $r \ge r_{min}\sqrt{2}$.

Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that, for a given failure configuration, the network is asymptotically connected in L_{∞} for all $r \ge r_{min}$ but is not asymptotically connected for all $r \ge r_{min}\sqrt{2}$ in L_2 . Observe that it is possible to circumscribe a L_{∞} neighborhood of range r by a L_2 neighborhood of range $r\sqrt{2}$ (Fig. 10). Hence the nodes in an L_2 network of transmission range $r\sqrt{2}$ can be made to simulate the operation of nodes in a L_{∞} network with range r (as the L_{∞} neighborhood is fully contained within the L_2 neighborhood). This implies that if the L_{∞} network of range r is connected (covered), so must be the L_2 network of range $r\sqrt{2}$. If there is some $r \ge r_{min}$ for which the L_{∞} network of range r is connected network (covered) asymptotically, but the L_2 network of range $r\sqrt{2}$ is not, we obtain a contradiction, as connectedness (coverage) of the L_{∞} network would imply connectedness (coverage) of the L_2 network.

LEMMA 13: If the network is asymptotically disconnected (not covered) in L_{∞} for all $r \leq r_{min}$, then the network is disconnected (not covered) asymptotically in L_2 for all $r \leq r_{min}$.

Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Consider a failure configuration such that the network is asymptotically disconnected (not covered) in L_{∞} for range r, but is not disconnected (not covered) in L_2 for range r. Observe that an L_{∞} neighborhood of transmission range r circumscribes an L_2 neighborhood of range r (Fig. 10). Thus, for any given random failure configuration, if the L_2 network of range r were connected (covered), so would be the L_{∞} network of radius r, as we could simply make the nodes in the L_{∞} network simulate the behavior of nodes in the L_2 network, and obtain connectedness (coverage). Hence, if the L_2 network of range $r \leq r_{min}$ is not asymptotically disconnected (not covered), the L_{∞} network of range $r \leq r_{min}$ must also not be disconnected (not covered). This yields a contradiction.

XIX. NON-TOROIDAL NETWORKS

We have made the assumption that the network is toroidal, so as to avoid edge effects. However, we can see that the degree of any node at the outermost edge is no more than d, and at least $\frac{d}{4}$ (where d is the uniform degree that each node would have in the toroidal case). Thus, the necessary condition would continue to hold as is (since some nodes having a lesser degree can only increase the probability of disconnection). The construction used to prove the sufficient condition also continues to hold as is, since all full-cells in the tiling will have at least one active node each, and even if there are regions at the fringes left-over, they will still fall within range of some active node in the nearest full tile (due to the chosen dimensions of the cells). Thus, the results are not affected. A similar argument leads to the conclusion that the coverage results are not affected.

XX. DISCUSSION

An interesting observation is that the form of the results for Byzantine failures is very similar to the results for crash-stop failures/connectivity. For Byzantine failures, we have obtained that the critical node degree for grid networks is $\Theta(d_{min} + \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{2p} + \ln \frac{1}{2(1-p)}})$, which may be re-stated as $\Theta(d_{min} + \frac{\ln n}{D(Q_{\frac{1}{2}}||P)})$ where $Q_{\frac{1}{2}}$ denotes the *Bernoulli* $(\frac{1}{2})$ distribution, *P* denotes the *Bernoulli*(*p*) distribution, and D(Q||P) denotes the *relative entropy* (or Kullback-Leibler distance) between distributions *Q* and *P*. Similarly, the node degree for crash-stop failures/connectivity is $\Theta(d_{min} + \frac{\ln n}{\ln \frac{1}{p}})$, and may be viewed as as $\Theta(d_{min} + \frac{\ln n}{\lim D(Q||P)})$, where *Q* is the *Bernoulli*(*q*) distribution, and *P* is the *Bernoulli*(*p*) distribution.

Recall that we derive the necessary condition from isolated failure events, and this is found to match the sufficient condition within a constant factor. Thus, possibly failure events involving isolated nodes not receiving correct broadcast may be the dominant failure events ⁵.

⁵Note that in [17], it was found that the primary disconnection events in non-faulty *random* networks are those involving single isolated nodes.

Focusing on these isolated failure events, the obtained expressions for node degree can be explained in the light of Sanov's Theorem [10]. As per Sanov's Theorem, the probability of occurrence of the event-set $\mathcal{E} = \{$ half or more neighbors faulty $\}$ is dominated by the probability of the event in \mathcal{E} closest in relative entropy to the governing fault distribution *P*. Since we are considering the regime $p < \frac{1}{2}$, the closest event is that of exactly half the neighbors faulty, corresponding to $Q_{\frac{1}{2}}$. In light of this, the critical degree expression for Byzantine failures is quite intuitive. One can similarly explain the crash-stop results.

The necessary and sufficient condition for connectivity in a sensor network where nodes sleep with probability p was shown in [19] to be $\Theta(\frac{\ln(n(1-p))}{1-p})$ (when expressed in our notation) for the case of a randomly deployed network. This problem is equivalent to that of crash-stop failures in random networks. Our sufficient condition for random networks with Byzantine failure probability $p < \frac{1}{2}$ is $O(\frac{\ln n}{\frac{1}{2}-p+\frac{1}{2}\ln\frac{1}{2(1-p)}})$. There is a similarity of form in the two results, and one may interpret the critical node degree as being $O(\max\{\ln n(1-p), \frac{\ln n(1-p)}{D(Q||P)}\})$ where q = 1 for the sleeping/crash-stop case in [19], and $q = \frac{1}{2}$ for the Byzantine failure case.

Also note that both our grid network and random network results (for Byzantine failure) have similar structural form, involving a minimum term required for connectivity without disruptive (Byzantine) behavior, and a second term required to ensure broadcast even in presence of failure.

Additionally, it is evident that the expressions for the grid network and random network diverge when $p \rightarrow 0$, but are otherwise within a constant factor of each other (for p bounded away from 0). This difference is quite intuitive. In a grid network, as failure probability $p \rightarrow 0$, the network tends towards a deterministic topology, whereas in a random network, if failure or sleep probability $p \rightarrow 0$, the network can only tend towards a denser but still random network. Thus, at small values of p, a very small degree will suffice for a grid network, but may not for a random network. At larger p values, the grid network exhibits increasing randomness and begins to resemble a network with random deployment. Thus, one may see that the two expressions are within a small range of each other when p is large (given sufficiently large n), but diverge as $p \rightarrow 0$.

XXI. CONCLUSIONS

We considered the problem of reliable broadcast in wireless networks with permanent probabilistic Byzantine failures, and obtained tight bounds for asymptotic achievability of broadcast in grid and random deployments. We also have results for crash-stop failure that are more accurate than earlier known results for this latter case.

XXII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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