CS Undergraduate Research Opportunities

Information Page

The page below provides information on various ways of participating in undergraduate research, and also a link to the past undergraduate senior thesis.

https://cs.georgetown.edu/undergraduate-research/


Slides from 6 faculty presenters are included here

- Ben Ujcich
- Sasha Golovnev
- Lisa Singh
- Eric Burger
- Shin'ichiro Matsuo
- Nitin Vaidya
- Note that many other CS faculty are also interested in mentoring undergraduate researchers. Please visit the faculty webpages to find the faculty working in research areas of your interest.

Benjamin E. Ujcich Assistant Professor, CS @ Georgetown








About Me

- Joined CS @ Georgetown in Fall 2020
- Member of the Georgetown SecLab
- Broad research interests: design of secure and accountable systems and networks



Current Research Projects


- Secure & accountable software-defined networking (SDN)
- Secure & accountable next generation networks
- Data provenance and data protection regulations


Secure & Accountable Software-Defined Networking (SDN)

CONTROL

PLANE

<u>Traditional networks</u>: Distributed decision-making (STP for forwarding, RIP/OSPF for routing, etc.)





Secure & Accountable Next Generation Networks







5G networks

Programmable data planes

Intent-based networking

Data Protection Regulations

- How do data protection regulations inform systems and networking design?
- How can secure and accountable systems and networking design inform data protection regulations?
- Data provenance as an accountability mechanism



Thanks!




Benjamin E. Ujcich E-mail: <u>bu31@georgetown.edu</u> Web: <u>https://personal.benujcich.georgetown.domains</u>


Theoretical Computer Science

Sasha Golovnev


Georgetown University, 2021

















What resources are required to solve a given computational problem?




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Outline



Outline



alex.golovnev@gmail.com


Undergraduate Opportunities


Prof. Eric Burger eric.burger@georgetown.edu https://people.cs.georgetown.edu/~eburger





GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CyberSMART


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
















Undergraduate Research Opportunities EventBlockchain Research

Shin'ichiro Matsuo Shinichiro.Matsuo@georgetown.edu







About me



- Member of SecLab Director of Cyber SMART research center Co-chair of Blockchain Governance Initiative Network (BGIN)
- Co-Founder of Bsafe.network (Blockchain Global Testbed)
- A member of OECD Blockchain Expert Policy Advisory Board(BEPAB)
- Founder of CELLOS Consortium (Evaluation of Cryptographic Protocols)

I have no Bitcoin and any cryptoassets.



Current People at Georgetown University CyberSMART

Faculties

Computer Science



Shin'ichiro Matsuo (Director: Cryptography and security)

McDonough School of Business



Reena Aggarwal (Stock market, IPO)



Vlad Babich

Center for National Security and the Law



-aW Clare Sullivan (Managing Director, Digital identity and privacy)



Eric Burger (Network Security)



James Angel (Regulation)



Perianne Boring (FinTech and Blockchain)




Ophir Frieder (Communication Systems)



John Jacobs (Former CMO of NASDAQ)

Researchers / Students

Research Assistant



Jianna SU



Michael Bartholic



Sachin Meier

Visiting Research Fellow



Ryosuke Ushida



Yusuke Ikeno

Intern




Kentaro Sako




Blockchain

- and chained digital signature
- Used in digital assets like Bitcoin
- Anyone can join/leave at any moment



Fundamental techniques to realize "Public Ledger" using P2P network





2008

]Shin'ichiro Matsuo, Ph..D. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY





Research Challenge

- 1. Security of Blockchain/Smart Contract
 - 1. Protocol Security
 - 2. Custodians (with Coinbase)
 - 3. Game theory (with NTT)
- 2. Applications of smart contract
- 3. Digital Currency and CBDC



Examples of undergraduate research


- 1. How to Dynamically Incentivize Sufficient Level of IoT Security (accepted at WTSC 20)
- 2. Proof of No-Work: How to Incentivize Individuals to Stay at Home (accepted at CBT 20)
- 3. Fairness in ERC token markets: A Case Study of CryptoKitties (accepted at WTSC 21)




How to Dynamically Incentivize Sufficient Level of IoT Security

- Cyber insurance, as a way to transfer risk of losses to insurer, drives improvements in cyber security by incentivizing insured party to take security controls.
- Cyber insurance covers risks caused by technical and human factors. This project concentrates on those technical factors.
- Provide a dynamic view into an enterprise's vulnerabilities and responses to vulnerabilities
- Provide a financial incentive to enterprises to proactively secure their network environment
- Provide a dynamic insurance pricing scheme for traditional cyber insurance
- Provide timestamped information for public verification
- Automate insurance processes to a certain extent

Use of Searchable Encryption, Plaintext Equality Test J. Su, M. Bartholic, A. Stange, R. Ushida and S. Matsuo, "How to Dynamically Incentivize Sufficient Level of IoT Security," WTSC 20









Proof of No-Work: How to Incentivize Individuals to Stay at Home

- Contact tracing applications:

 - 2020 global pandemic greats new challenges for addressing Invasive data collection (usually bluetooth and GPS based) • Focused on tracking infections and possibly exposed individuals (follow ups) Individuals often still behave without concern for elevated risks
- Problems include:
 - Unnecessary data collection and tracking
 - It may be more effective to incentivise behavioral change rather than track possible exposures after they've happened
 - No concrete incentive mechanism to act in ways that reduce risks

M. Bartholic, J. Su, R. Ushida, Y. Ikeno, Z. Gu and S. Matsuo, "Proof of No-Work: How to Incentivize Individuals to Stay at Home," CBT20








Proof of No-Work: How to Incentivize Individuals to Stay at Home

- In order to adequately incentivize individuals to act to the benefit of the community, we must develop an individualized incentive that responds to each person's own behavior. We also need to pay mind to minimize data collection and maintain reasonable computational efficiency.
 - Basic Requirements:
 - Proof of location, over time
 - Verifiable time to prevent replay attack
 - Scoring system (incentive mechanism) that can be publicly verifiable



M. Bartholic, J. Su, R. Ushida, Y. Ikeno, Z. Gu and S. Matsuo, "Proof of No-Work: How to Incentivize Individuals to Stay at Home," CBT20









Fairness in ERC token markets: A Case Study of CryptoKitties

Players try to earn ETHs by trading ERC-721 tokens. -This token is a kitty.



K. Sako, S. Matsuo and S. Meier, "Fairness in ERC token markets: A Case Study of CryptoKitties," WTSC21

Fix unfairness of the game caused by imperfect random function







Thank you!

Email: Shinichiro.Matsuo@georgetown.edu








Distributed Algorithms

Nitin Vaidya Georgetown University





Distributed Algorithms

Distributed algorithms have wide-ranging applications

- Cloud computing
- Machine learning
- Social networks
- Swarm robotics
- Multi-core processors
- Supercomputing
- •

My Current Research

 Distributed optimization and machine learning: Security & Privacy

- Consistency of key-value stores
- Distributed consensus
- Graph algorithms

Other Faculty in Parallel & Distributed Algorithms

Jeremy Fineman



Security and Privacy


for

Distributed Optimization and Learning

Consensus



Consensus



Consensus

X

 $f_3(x)$

 $f_1(x)$

minimize $\sum f_i(x)$

 $f_2(x)$


Machine Learning


 Data is distributed across different agents



 Data is distributed across different

 Collaborate to learn agents





Machine Learning



Minimize global loss $\sum f_i(x)$


Challenges

Challenge #1


Fault-tolerant (secure) distributed optimization

$$f_1(x) + f_2(x) + f_3(x)$$


How to optimize if agents inject bogus information?













Machine Learning



Machine Learning




Faulty agents can adversely affect model parameters

Minimize global loss $\sum f_i(x)$

Challenge #2

Privacy-preserving distributed optimization

How to collaborate without revealing own cost function?



My Current Research

- Distributed optimization and machine learning: Security & Privacy
- Consistency of key-value stores
- Distributed consensus
- Graph algorithms

For More Information

https://disc.georgetown.domains

Tutorial on Security and Privacy in Distributed Optimization and Learning (above page, go to Talks)